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ABSTRACT
CAN WE INFER OUR EMPIRICAL BELIEFS FROM OUR SENSE
EXPERIENCES?
February 1996
Rinita Mazumdar
B.A. University of Calcutta, Calcutta
M.A., University of Calcutta, Calcutta
M.A., Brock University, Ontario
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Amherst
Directed by: Professor Bruce Aune
Inference is a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states
are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops (or loops which connect
different stimulus); their intrinsic feature is recognition. In inference or reasoning
the transition process between belief states is regulated by the rule of concept usage,
involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states
are also biological states whose extrinsic feature is recognition, such that, one can
have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing it as an experience of X. One
can, however, also have an experience of an X; in the latter case, one not only has
an X-type experience but also recognizes an X as an X. In some cases the transition
from X-type experience to believing an X to be there instantiates a quasi-inferential
pattern. In all such cases the transition process is regulated by the rule of X
usage. In such quasi-inferential transition additional belief states are involved. Such
states assert that there are no countervailing factors and there are additional factors
conducive to the conclusion. Such belief states are expressed non-propositionally in
the language of thought. Propositions are a necessary part of such quasi-inference
vii
for they give content to thoughts to which one can assign ‘falsity’ and defeasible
reasoning requires us to assign ‘falsity’ to our thoughts. Propositions implicated in
the quasi-inferences from experience types to belief states are the evidential reasons
for the conclusion and they can only be accepted as provisionally true and have to
be revised in the light of further information.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In Western philosophy reasoning or inference is generally assumed to be a purely
intellectual process. Inference, it is generally believed, occurs when beliefs (propos-
itions) get connected in such a way that the derived beliefs are well-grounded if the
basis beliefs are well-grounded. According to this view, whereas the transition from
‘X is a whale’ (basis belief) to ‘X is a mammal’ (derived belief) instantiates a valid
inferential pattern, the transition from ‘X is a whale’ (basis belief) to ‘X is a number’
(derived belief) does not. In the first transition the derived belief is well-grounded
by the basis belief; in other words, the basis belief is appropriate in producing the
derived belief. In the second transition it is not so. Sense-experiences, according to
this view, essentially involve non-intellectual physiological (biological) mechanisms
and supposedly play no part in reasoning or inference. Hence, it is assumed that
nothing can be inferred from sense-experiences — a view I refute. S” s believing that
there is an apple on the table is caused or sustained by his experiencing an apple on
the table. S's subsequent success in acquiring an apple (not an orange) from the table
shows that his believing the existence of an apple is well-grounded on his experience
of the apple, i.e., the experience is appropriate in producing the belief. Clearly, this
transition from the experience of an apple (together with the belief that there are
no countervailing conditions) to believing the existence of an apple instantiates an
acceptable inferential process.
I show in this dissertation that we make successful inferential connections between
our sense-experiences regarding the external world and our beliefs regarding it. In
2this dissertation I develop theories regarding our experience of the external world,
the belief states that these experiences give rise to, the inferential patterns that such
transitions instantiate, and our conceptual abilities. Both belief states and experien-
tial states are, I show here, physical (biological) states. While belief states are states
of primary consciousness with recognition as their intrinsic feature, experiential
states are states whose extrinsic feature is recognition. Thus my theory reduces the
gulf between experiential and belief states. My scientific framework is G. Edelman’s
(1992) theory of Neuronal Group Selection which explains intellectual processes in
terms of multi-layer complex systems that interact and recategorize both themselves
and the external world. Furthermore, I develop a theory of concepts according to
which having a concept is an ability. S has the concept of an apple, for example, only
if S can identify an apple as an apple and distinguish it from an orange. Next, I show
that it is possible to trace inference-like patterns between some of our experiential
states and our belief states. In such connections the belief states are well-grounded
by the experiences and these experiences are the causal reasons for the belief states.
In such experience-belief transitions additional beliefs (propositions) are implicated;
they are the evidential reason for the conclusion. These beliefs (propositions) are
empirical and hence are not absolutely certain; nonetheless, they can be shown to
be probable and we can revise them in the light of further knowledge.
In chapter 1 I clarify my notion of inference. In the first half of the chapter
my main concern is to explain and criticize a notion of inference that I call ‘The
Heuristic Theory of Reasoning’. According to this theory, to reason is to know some
implicit and explicit set of rationally connected propositions. In the next half of
chapter 1 I develop my own theory of inference; central to this theory is the notion
that belief states are states of primary consciousness. Following Edelman’s (1992)
theory of Neuronal Group Selection, I show that belief states are reentrant loops
connecting two different stimulus responses; these reentrant loops get connected to
3memory, where the rules of concept-usage are stored, and a belief state is formed.
According to this view, recognition is an intrinsic feature of any belief state (of
primary consciousness). Inference is a causal transition from one state of primary
consciousness to another; such transitions instantiate inferential patterns by following
the rules of concept usage involved within these states. Thus S”s belief state that he
sees an apple can produce his believing that an apple is there. Such transition of
thought is possible because S has the concept of an apple: S can identify an apple as
an apple and distinguish it from, say, an orange. The rules of concept-usage, thus,
regulate and put contraints on the inferential process.
Traditionally, western philosophy has espoused what is known as the truth-
conditional view of concepts. According to this theory, a person S has the concept
of X only if S is governed by the legitimate pattern of inference which individuates
the concept. Thus, S has the concept of bachelor only if S can make the following
inference: L P is a bachelor (premise); hence, P is an unmarried male’. I do not
adhere to the truth-conditional view of concepts because it is vitiated by the problem
generated by what Dummett calls the Inextricability Thesis (IT). According to IT,
there is no reliable criteria by which we can separate between those concepts that are
individuated by analytic inferences and those that are not, for, as Quine has shown,
the entire synthetic-analytic distinction is spurious. Also, I show in chapter 2 that
in ordinary language we deal with not only the formal features of a concept but also
its substantive features.
In chapter 2 I develop a theory of concept acquisition consistent with the model
of inference and belief states that I had developed earlier. I call this the ‘Operational
Theory of Concepts’. According to this view of concepts, having a concept is not
propositional knowledge; it is an ability or a ‘knowing how’. S has the concept of
whale only if S can identify a whale as a whale and distinguish it from, say, a bird.
S, however, may not be guided by the following inferential pattern: ‘A is a whale;
4hence, A is a mammal’. According to the operational view, knowing a concept is an
ability: to be able to use that concept correctly. We can judge whether a rule is used
correctly or not by testing its conformity to a norm or standard — natural language.
In other words, rules of concept-usage are justified normatively; we judge them as
correct or incorrect in accordance with whether or not they conform to the standard
usage in natural language. We use these rules in the same way we use the rules of
swimming or driving which guide our action; we internalize rules of concept-usage
and they guide our linguistic behaviors.
In chapter 3 I expound my view of experiential states. Experiential states,
like belief states, are mental (brain) states; when S experiences an apple, P can
describe S’ s experience as “its seeming to S that an apple is there”. Unlike belief
states, however, recognition is not an intrinsic feature of experiential states; it is
an extrinsic or acquired feature of them. There is a strong tradition in philosophy
according to which recognition (interpretation/representation) is an intrinsic feature
of an experiential state. According to this view, experiences are always in the form of
something’s seeming to be the case for the subject. McGinn (1982), Peacocke (1983),
and Searle (1986) espouse such a view. In chapter 3 I argue against the views held by
the above philosophers; I show that recognition is an extrinsic or acquired feature of
experience. My arguments center around the following two theses: (1)5 can have an
A-type experience without experiencing an X as an A1
; (2) experience is essentially
bottom-up information processing.
In chapter 4 the topics discussed in chapters 1, 2, and 3 come together. Here
I show that it is possible to trace quasi-inferential connections between experience
and belief states. I show that we can evaluate some of our belief states in relation
to appropriate experience-types. Central to this view is the theory of ‘replay’. The
theory of replay that I develop here has to be distinguished from the Cartesian theory
Mhis is the view advocated by Millar (1991).
5of repla\ (introspection) in which we recall something we had previously seen and
then ‘see’ it in imagination. According to the theory that I expound in this chapter,
we do not recall an image
;
we recall the experience-type itself. Then we evaluate the
belief state in the light of that experience type which caused it. This shows that an
experience-type is relevant in evaluating the correctness of a belief state.
In chapter 4 I discuss the structure of quasi-inference from an experience type to
a belief state; the structure is as follows:
1. S has an apple-type visual experience.
2. S is in the experiential state in which it seems to him that an apple is there.
3. S is unaware of countervailing conditions for apples existing in the environment.
4.
S is in the belief state that an apple is there.
Here the conclusion (belief state) is well-grounded by the apple-type experience
because the experience-type appropriately causes the belief state. The entire quasi-
inference is regulated by the rules of “apple” usage. Hence, this is a regulative theory
of inference as opposed to a reliability theory, according to which an inference is
acceptable if the causal process by which it is produced is reliable. The above quasi-
inference does not take into consideration the transition process by which conclusion
is formed; it proceeds by following the rule of “apple" usage — it is regulated by the
rule of “apple” usage. If someone experiences an apple then his believing that an
apple is there is justified. This above quasi-inference (from apple-type experience to
6believing an apple to be there) requires additional beliefs which help the transition
process from the experience type to the belief state.
In the above quasi-inference Ss belief is a factor conducive to apples being on
the table. Both his experiential state and this belief state are causal reasons for 5"
s
belief state that there is an apple. S belief state, however, does not tell us what the
factors are, or, in other words, what the beliefs (“all cases of apple-type experience
are caused by apples”, “no nectarines can cause apple-type experiences”, etc) are.
These general propositions form the evidential reasons for Ss belief state that an
apple is there. Now later as he knows more about the concept2 of an apple, S learns
that sometimes plastic apples cause apple-type experience. This new information
undercuts the previous generalization that all apple-type experiences are caused by
apples. 5, then, assigns “falsity” to the proposition “all apple-type experiences are
caused by apples” . This way of proceeding in our thought process by assigning
falsity to some of our previous thoughts is known in Artificial Intelligence as default
or defeasible reasoning. Thus, we come to accept propositions by default reasoning.
I said above that S’ s belief in the general proposition “all apple-type experiences
are caused by apples” may subsequently be assigned falsity and can be substituted by
the proposition “some apple type experiences are not caused by apples”
;
nonetheless,
so long as the proposition “all apple-type experiences are caused by apples” is not de-
feated, S takes it to be a justified belief. The latter belief forms the evidential reason
for S to be in a belief state that there are apples. What constitutes the justification
of the such general propositions? One reply is that these general propositions play a
normative role within Ss evaluative practices. A proposition, p, says Millar (1991),
is normative for an individual if that individual can legitimately yet groundlessly hold
p. Sceptics might say that we believe many propositions to be true whose grounds
are not legitimate; we believe them because of superstitions. What, then, constitutes
2 Conceptual abilities are dynamic as I show in chapter 2.
7the justification of these general propositions which form the evidential reasons for
our conclusions? The foundationalists and the coherentists have their own answers
to this question. I show in chapter 5 that none of these answers is acceptable.
Hume says that all general truths can be reduced to causal connections and that
no causal connection can be logically justified. According to him, we draw causal
conclusions on the basis of instinct and not on the basis of on any practical rule’.
In chapter 6 I show that while it is true that there is no strict deductive rule by
which we can go from particular instances to the general conclusion “All apple-type
experiences are caused by apples”, there is an inductive rule
(IR ) which produces this
conclusion. The inductive rule is as follows: If n/m of an appropriate evidence class
of things K has the property P, then probably all K’s have P. According to Russell
(1948), IR cannot be accepted because it gives rise to false conclusion from true
premises more often than not. Suppose I have observed some cows; these cows then
have the property of being observed by me. From this we can conclude (falsely)
by using the inductive rule IR that all cows have the property of being observed.
Further, in recent times Goodman (1948) also showed that there is some problem
with applying the inductive rule: it gives rise to incompatible conclusions from the
same evidence. To avoid Russell’s and Goodman’s problems some have attempted
to use the hypothetico-deductive method. Instead of thinking of general propositions
as generalization from particular instances, they thought of them as hypotheses to
be tested and by using them to make predictions. If the predictions are verified
then the general hypotheses are confirmed to some degree; if they are false, then the
hypotheses are refuted. Unfortunately, this method too is not immune to Goodman’s
criticism. A modification of the Hypothetico-deductive method is Inference to the
Best Explanation. According to the latter, we should choose the best hypothesis
that explains the evidence. The criteria that we use for our selection are simplicity,
testibility, and better coherence with other established hypothesis. Inference to the
8Best Explanation
,
however, does not answer the following questions: (1) “What is the
degree of confirmation of a hypothesis given an item of evidence?” (2) “What is the
degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by the occurrence of antecedent unlikely
evidence?”. To answer these questions I relate Inference to the Best Explanation
to probability calculus in the last chapter of this dissertation. In doing so I place
special weight upon Bayes’s theorem which can be formulated as follows:
• P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/P(e)
To apply the above theorem we need hypothesis which already have probability
assignments. I must therefore face the question, “What justifies us in assigning
these probability values?” Most probability values are relative to the probability
value of some other hypotheses. Thus, we choose hypotheses which have the highest
relative probability value. The probability values of the initial hypotheses are not
relative, however; their probability value is absolute. The question is, “How we can
justify the probability assignment of the initial hypotheses whose probability value is
absolute?” I end this chapter by suggesting that since all these hypotheses are empir-
ical, we cannot accept them as certain; nonetheless, we adopt some initial uncertain
hypotheses because they conform to some rationally unobjectionable epistemic ends
that we have adopted. Following Aune (1991), I suggest that we should choose
those hypotheses which conform to our epistemic ends such as following: simplicity,
comprehensiveness, systematic unity, and fidelity (p. 191). Thus, I may choose
hypothesis h over its rivals as h contributes towards a conceptual scheme which is
simpler or has minimal redundancy of concepts and explanatory power. Accepting
a hypothesis is a form of behavior. Such a behavior, Aune says, is epistemically
permissible when it conforms to unobjectionable epistemic standards or norms that
we have adopted. Since empirical propositions can never be intrinsically true, the
hypothesis we accept must be viewed only as provisional and we should revise them
9if necessary in the light of further information. Since it is not humanly possible
to consider all the alternatives of a hypotheses, we can justifiably consider only a
limited number of alternative hypotheses in choosing these initial hypotheses. We
must do so, however, in a critical spirit. If someone points out to us some further
hypothesis as a significant alternative, we should consider that too.
In concluding this dissertation I discuss some important topics that I have touched
upon, but not elaborated, in the main body of the dissertation. I also talk about the
areas, lelevant to this dissertation, in which I would like to do further research.
CHAPTER 2
Inference: The Heuristic View vs. The
Naturalistic View
My aim in this chapter is explore the question, “What is reasoning or inference?”
In the course of this chapter I explain and criticize a theory of reasoning or inference
which I call the ‘Heuristic theory of reasoning (or inference)’ that views reasoning as
making rational connections among propositions. The main problems with this view
are that, as I show here, (1) this type of so-called ‘reasoning’ can be simulated in a
machine, and, as I also show, machines, at least in the present state of technology,
cannot be said to be ‘reasoning’; (2) this theory does not accurately reflect human
concept acquisition and conceptual ability; (3) it ignores the biological component of
reasoning; (4) it has no scientific framework to support itself. In the course of this
chapter I develop a naturalistic theory of reasoning or inference.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In section 1 I critically survey
the Heuristic Theory of Reasoning which I develop primarily from Schank’s (1977)
program. According to this view, to reason is to know some implicit and explicit
set of ‘rationally connected’ propositions; one who ‘reasons’, according to this view,
manipulates some propositions. This view of reasoning excludes how we as biological
beings actually reason. In section 2 I discuss the ‘naturalistic view of reasoning.’ The
scientific framework from which I draw my theory is G. Edelman’s theory of (1992)
Neuronal Group Selection. In the course of this section, I discuss this theory briefly.
I conclude this chapter with a brief note on why we have to import propositions into
our ontology.
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2.1 The Heuristic Theory of Inference or Reasoning
Heuiistic Theory of Reasoning’, I contend, has its origin in ancient Greece.
Starting with the Greek invention of logic and geometry, Dreyfus (1963) observes,
it was believed that all reasoning might be reduced to some kind of calculations
(Introduction). Dreyfus says that for Plato all knowledge must be stated in explicit
definitions — ‘knowing how’ must be reduced to ‘knowing that’. Although, as Drey-
fus says, Plato was more concerned with semantics than with syntax
,
the Galelian
tendency to formalize physics set a trend to reduce all semantic considerations to
formal manipulations. As Hobbes (1958) said, “ When a man reasons
,
he does
nothing but conceive a sum-total from the addition of parcels,” “for REASON is
nothing but reckoning” (p. 45). Further, for Descartes, all understanding “Consists
in forming and using appropriate symbolic representations. For Descartes, these
representations were complex descriptions built out of primitive ideas or elements,
and Frege showed that rules could be formalized so that they could be manipulated
without intuition or interpretation” (Dreyfus, 1993 — Introduction).
In recent times workers in Artificial Intelligence (around 1950’s in the U.S) have
echoed similar sentiments regarding reasoning; to reason, according to them, is to
make some connection among propositions. One of the goals of some workers is to
reproduce reasoning in machines. Among these workers, to name a few, are Roger
Schank and Terry Winograd for whom reasoning is some kind of ‘formal symbolic
manipulation’. Schank’s program was to simulate human cognition in a machine. He
wanted to do this by showing that a machine can be said to be reasoning in the way a
human does if it is able to answer questions concerning facts not explicitly contained
in a piece of information 1 . Suppose individual S imparts to individual P the following
^chanks’ original idea was that after hearing a story a machine can answer questions about the
story which are not explicitly part of the story. I adopt this a little differently.
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information: A is the mother in law of B and A has a tendency to resent B. Now, after
P has this information, individual T asks P
,
“Is it true that an offspring of A is the
spouse of BT '
,
P will answer “Yes”
. Again, if T asks, “Is it true that the offspring of A
is not the spouse of BT' Then P will answer “No”. “Schankians” would argue that P
can be said to be reasoning by being able to answer the questions that T posed. Such
reasoning, Schank contends, can be simulated into a machine. To do this, according
to Schank, machines must have a sort of “representation” that humans beings have
about “mother-in-law” which enables them to answer questions of the above sort.
When machines are given the above information and asked questions not explicitly
contained in the information, they will give a printout corresponding to the answers
that humans give. This shows, “Schankians” would argue, that the machine, by virtue
of some representation, can make rational connections among implicit and explicit
rationally connected propositions. I call this the ‘Heuristic Theory of Reasoning’.
This type of reasoning accurately models, according to these AI researchers, human
reasoning. I show in the next few pages that Heuristic Reasoning cannot be taken
as accurately reflecting how humans reason or make inferences.
Searle (1980) has shown by his thought experiment (known as the Chinese Room
argument) that it is false to assume that the machine is reasoning because it can
answer the above question. Depicting the heuristic model as the model for explaining
reasoning or inference, according to Searle, is therefore wrong. I present here Searle’s
(1980) thought experiment in a nut-shell. Take the case of an individual, S', who is a
native English speaker and is illiterate in Chinese; Chinese script for S are, in Searle’s
(1980) language, “meaningless squiggles” (p. 418.). Now suppose S is locked up in
a room and at three different stages he is given three different batches of Chinese
scripts. At first he is given simply a batch of Chinese writings. At the second stage
S is given a second batch of Chinese scripts with a set of rules in English by which S
can correlate the scripts in the first batch to that in the second. Now, being a native
13
English speaker, S has no problems understanding the rules2
. These rules enable S
to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set; as Searle says, ‘formal’ here
means that S can “identify the symbols entirely by their shapes” (p. 418). At the
third stage, S is given further scripts and some instructions in English to correlate
the scripts of the third batch to the scripts of the first two batches. Also, these rules
instruct S how to give back certain Chinese symbols of certain shapes in response to
certain sorts of shapes given to S in the third batch. After a lot of trial and error, S
becomes an expert at manipulating and matching the Chinese symbols. Now S can
give back answers in Chinese as well as a native Chinese speaker. Further, S is given
a set of English letters and is asked some questions and he has to answer back in
English which he does efficiently as he is a native English speaker. From the point of
view of someone outside the room
,
&s answers in Chinese are indistinguishable from
a native Chinese speaker; they are as good as his answers in English. In the Chinese
case, there is a series of input and output. The followers of Schank and Turing claim
that such series of input and output and symbolic manipulations accurately model
how humans reason, and such reasoning can be perfectly simulated in a machine.
While agreeing with the contention that such series of input and output can
be perfectly simulated in a machine, I have serious doubts regarding the reasoning
or inferential powers of a machine. My contention is that machines cannot make
inferential connections. It is an assumption of the followers of Schank that input-
output and symbolic manipulation is enough to explain reasoning; only in case of
the Chinese sentences it is more ‘formal’ manipulation than in the case of English
sentences. The basic difference between the English and the Chinese sentence is
that, as Searle says, whereas in the former case S understands the meaning of what
he is saying, in the latter case, as Searle says, he does not understand the meaning
of what he is saying. The assumption here, as Searle says, is as follows: we can
2One can use the word “program” for rules.
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construct a program that will have the same input and output as a native speaker.
Searle observes, “The computer and its program do not provide sufficient conditions
of understanding since the computer and the program are functioning, and there is
no understanding” (p. 418). Searle also says,
In the Chinese case I have everything that artificial intelligence can put into
me by way of a program and I understand nothing; in the English case I
understand everything, and there is so far no reason at all to suppose that
my understanding has anything to do with complex program, that is, with
computational operations on purely formally specified elements. As long
as the program is defined in terms of computational operations on purely
formally defined elements, what the example suggests is that these by them-
selves have no interesting connection with understanding. They are certainly
not sufficient conditions, and not the slightest reason has been given to
suppose that they are necessary conditions or even that they make significant
contribution to understanding. ...
Well then what is it that I have in the case of the English sentences that I do
not have in the case of the Chinese sentences? The obvious answer is that I
know what the former mean, while I hav’nt the faintest idea what the latter
mean. (p. 418.)
To summarize, what is considered reasoning by the Heuristic view can be very
well simulated in a machine; nonetheless, it does not involve understanding on the
part of the manipulator, the machine. It cannot model how humans really reason
because humans do understand connections among facts when they are reasoning.
Searle’s Chinese Room argument, however, has not been universally accepted.
Following Searle, I call the first objection the Systems or Berkeley Reply. According
to this objection, while S' by himself does not understand Chinese, it is the sum-total
of S plus the pencil, paper, data bank that understand the inferential pattern. In
other words, the whole system understands the inferential pattern. The problem with
this assumption is that there are two sub-systems in S, one understanding English and
the other understanding Chinese. While the English system, for example, knows that
“mother-in-law” refers to mother in law, the Chinese system knows that “squiggle
squiggle” is followed by “squaggle squaggle”. Searle says, “All he knows is that
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various formal symbols are being introduced at one end and manipulated according
to rules written in English, and the other symbols are going out the other end” (p.
419). This clearly does not involve understanding meaning of the symbols on the
part of S or the machine. Searle observes,
The only motivation for saying there must be a subsystem in me that un-
derstands Chinese is that I have a program and I can pass the Turing test;
I can fool native Chinese speakers. But precisely one of the points at issue
is the adequacy of the Turing test. The example shows that there could be
two “systems”
,
both of which pass the Turing test, but only one of which
understands; and it is no argument against this point to say that since they
both pass the Turing test they both must understand, since this claim fails
to meet the argument that the system in me that understands English has a
great deal more than the system that merely processes Chinese. In short, the
systems reply simply begs the question by insisting without argument that
the system must understand Chinese, (p. 419).
A further objection, which Searle calls the Robot or Yale reply
,
contends that
reasoning, as the following case shows, is not a matter of mere symbolic manipulation.
Suppose scientist S makes an android (or a robot) R-l in his lab. R-l has a T.V.
camera for vision, arms and legs for movement, and a computer for brain. Then
the robot would gather information through perception, walking around, moving,
etc, and cognize this information as a human being would; such cognition is not
a matter of symbolic input-output. The problems with this view is that first,
it implicitly accepts the point that cognition is not merely a matter of symbolic
manipulation. Second, as Searle observes, the same thought experiment as the
Chinese Room can be applied here to show that there is no understanding. Suppose
that instead of a computer in R-l ' s brain, S chooses to put his brother P there. P
receives some Chinese symbol via the T.V. camera and gives out some other Chinese
symbols to move the motors inside the robots arms and leg. All P is doing here is
really manipulating symbols: receiving “information” from the robot’s “perceptual”
apparatus and giving out “instructions” to its motor apparatus without knowing
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what he is doing. The robot, says Searle,“Is simply moving about as a result of its
electrical wiring and its program” (p. 420.).
Moreover, another objection, which Searle calls The Brain Simulator or Berkeley
and M.I.T. Reply
,
has been raised against Searle’s Chinese Room. Suppose that we
use a program which simulates in S the actual sequences of neural firings at the
synapses of the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he is reasoning instead of
using a heuristic input-output program. In this case, S takes in Chinese as inputs
which stimulates the same sequence of neurons as it had done with native Chinese
speakers and gi\es back answers in Chinese. There may be a whole set of programs
acting in parallel in the manner that actual human brains presumably operate when
they process natural language. In this case, we have to say that S does understand
what he is manipulating.
Searle raises some valid points against this objection. First of all, the above
objection is self-defeating. The entire point about the Heuristic view is that reasoning
consists in symbolic manipulation and input-output; it does not look into the actual
structure of the brain to determine how humans reason. Second, Searle says that
his Chinese Room argument, with slight variations, can be adopted here. Instead of
monolingual S with Chinese symbols, let us think of an individual P who is locked
in a room with an elaborate set of pipes and valves. Searle says,
When the man receives the Chinese symbols, he looks up the program, written
in English, which valves he has to turn off and on. Each water connection
correspond to a synapse in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged
up so that after doing all the right firings, that is after turning on all the right
faucets the Chinese answers pop out at the output end of the series of pipes.
Now where is the understanding in this system? It takes Chinese as input,
it simulates the formal structure of the synapse of the Chinese brain, and it
gives Chinese as output. But the man certainly does not understand Chinese,
neither do the water pipes, and if we are tempted to adopt what I think is the
absurd view that somehow the conjunction (sic) of man and (sic) water pipes
understands, remember that in principle the man can internalize the formal
structure of the water pipes and do all the “neuron firings” in his imagination
(p. 421).
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What this shows is that merely by simulating the neural sequence of firing in a
machine (or in this case in S’s brain), one cannot say that the machine or S thereby
understands the relevant reasoning pattern.
Furthermore, another objection, which Searle calls the Combination or Berkeley
and Stanford Reply
,
has been raised against Searle’s Chinese Room. According to
this objection, the only way we know that a native Chinese understands his language
is through his behavior; why cannot we say the same thing about 5? The objection
here is the same as above a mere input/output series does not make symbols
meaningful. So far we have dealt with the heuristic view of reasoning, which, as we
saw, can be simulated in a machine. This cannot be called reasoning or inference as
no understanding is involved here.
One objection, which Searle calls the Other Mind or Yale Reply
,
has been raised
against Searle’s Chinese Room. According to this objection, S knows that P has
a mind through observing P s behavior. Similarly, we can say of a machine, by
observing his behavior, that he has a mind. Searle objects to this reply by saying
that the problem with this objection is that the Chinese Room argument is not
concerned with knowing another person’s cognitive states but as Searle says, “What
it is that I am attributing to them when I attribute cognitive states to them. The
thrust of this argument is that it could’nt be just computational processes and their
output because the computational processes and their output can exist without the
cognitive state. It is no answer to this argument to feign anasthesia. In “cognitive
sciences” one presupposes the reality and knowability of the mental in the same
way that in physical sciences one has to presuppose the reality and knowability of
physical objects.” (p. 422).
A further objection, which Searle calls The Many Mansions or Berkeley Reply
,
has been raised against Searle’s Chinese Room. According to this objection, Searle’s
arguments are not directed towards AI as such but only towards analogue and digital
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computers where the input-output has no intentionality; but that has more to do with
the present state of technology than AI itself. Eventually, scientists may be able to
make a machine with intentionality in its input-output series. According to Searle
this objection reduces the whole purpose of AI to that which produces cognition.
The aim of AI is to produce mental processes that are computational processes over
formally defined elements. By redefining this claim the original purpose of AI is lost.
Moreover, I object to the Heuristic Theory of Reasoning, as it does not accurately
reflect human concept-acquisition process. The theory assumes that each time an
individual thinks of a concept (say, mother-in-law), he represents it in the form of
proposition which individuates it. This ignores an important component of learning
process of humans: habit formation and internalization of propositions. As I show
in chapter 5, perhaps at first individuals do learn concepts de dicto
,
gradually,
however, these concepts become de re for him. He does not have to remember
or evoke the entire proposition every time he thinks of the concept. This power of
internalizing concepts is absent in machines and is present in humans. Flores (1993)
observes, “Even though a beginner in a field like chess starts by following rules,
a mid-level player dispenses with such rules and uses more intuitive, holistic, and
seemingly immediate knowledge about what is happening in the game and what the
player should do. A high level expert, on the other hand, appears to combine more
experience-based rules of thumb with intuition” 3 .
In addition, according to the Heuristic view a concept is a static entity which is
individuated by the same set of propositions for an individual during his lifetime.
Concepts, I contend, are dynamic and the same concept may have different implica-
tions for the same individual at different times. Moreover, problem arises as subject,
the inferrer, is involved in the inferential process. According to the Heuristic view
3
I have quoted this from a part of Flores’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation which he presented
at the CAP conference, Los Angeles, 1994. Later, on my request, Flores sent the document to me
electronically.
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of reasoning, each proposition in an inferential process is independent and can exit
outside a human being. One proposition can be inferred from another without being
part of the subject’s epistemological framework; the relationship between an inferrer
and what he is manipulating, according to the Heuristic view, is thus an external
one. Lastly, I object to the Heuristic view of reasoning or inference as it does not
piovide any scientific framework for a philosophy of mind to support reasoning or
inference.
I provide below a scientific theory of the mind. First, any scientific theory of
the mind must show how our reasoning is rooted in the model of mind. Second,
the theory must be based on real experimental science and not on some a priori
arguments. Third, it must have a multi-level approach to the complex function of
brain and nervous system. Lastly, such a theory (like all good scientific theories)
must be falsifiable. I present below what I consider a solid scientific framework to
support my theory of reasoning or inference: Edelman’s theory of Neuronal Group
Selection.
2.2 The Naturalistic Theory of Inference
According to what I call the Naturalistic theory of Inference, inference is an
interconnection of belief states. Belief states, I contend, are states of consciousness
whose intrinsic feature is recognition 4 . Edelman defines recognition as, “Continual
adaptive matching or fitting of elements in one physical domain to novelty occurring
in elements of another, more or less independent domain, a matching that occurs
without prior instruction” (p. 74). If recognition is the intrinsic feature of belief
states then this definition clearly brings belief down to the realm of biological studies
4
1 argue later that a belief state is some sort of “remembered present” because the memory loop
which has the concept categorizes our reentrant loops.
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and relieves it of abstract propositional content. I consider below some aspects of
Edelman’s theory.
Edelman applies the theory of evolution to neurons. The interesting thing about
Edelman s concept of evolution is that he applies it to groups instead of to individual
cells. Cells, according to Edelman, form the embryological basis of our structures.
The most important feature of these cells is that they migrate from one place to
another, this migration is only partly determined by the DNA structure of the cells.
There are two factors that affect this migration: (1) the internal structure (DNA) of
the cell (the release of a particular DNA at a particular time is entirely determined
by its position in the entire structure); (2) the way the cell reacts according to
its definite position in the entire structure. DNA therefore is not the only factor
that directs each individual where to go and what to do. The trajectory of cells is
undetermined; they live in an undetermined amount of time (depending on internal
resource and the environment) and respond and function according to their internal
DNA programming and their location within the whole structure. Cells, including
neurons, survive as individuals. These migration of cells are responsible for tissues,
organs, and subsystem; the nervous system is such a subsystem and it is composed of
(at the basic level) neurons with dendrites at their ends loosely in contact with other
dendrites through synaptic connections (which are neurotransmitters or electrically
charged bio-molecules) through the limbs at the end of the dendrites. The number
of neurotransmitters fired between receptors are directly proportional to the electric
current charged between them. The strengthening or weakening of neural connections
is caused by the amount of neurotransmitters. The more signals pass through these
dendrites the stronger the connections are; the fewer signal pass, the weaker the
connection. The connections amongst neurons (directly or indirectly) form maps.
Thus, say, neuronx of clusteri is connected to all other neurons of clusteri, to neurons
of cluster2 , to tissues and organs (internal and external), and to a remote neuron
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in clustery through cluster2 . These connections among neurons and clusters can be
mapped; thus we have several maps tracing various connections among neurons [See
Figure 2.1 (Page 22)]. Edelman says,
Each map independently (sic) receives signals from other brain maps or from
the world (in this example, the signals come from the world). Within a certain
period, reentrant signaling strongly connects certain active combinations of
neural groups in one map to different combinations in the other map. This
occurs thiough the strengthening and weakening of synapses within groups in
each map and also at their connections with reentrant fibers. In this way, the
function and activities in one map are connected and correlated with those in
another map. This occurs even though each map is receiving independent
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signals from the world: One set of inputs could be, for example, from vision,
and the other from touch (p. 87). [See Figures 2.2 (Page 24, 2 3 (Page 25)
and 2.4 (Page 26)]
v 6 h
The question now is, “How can this structure account for belief states with
recognition as their intrinsic features?” The answer is as follows: Synaptic responses
to stimuli vary according to stimulus types — visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory.
Depending on the stimuli-type, independent maps are formed. The signals that come
to us from the environment create bio-molecular activity inside its own particular
cluster forming maps. Let us call the stimulus coming from a ripe banana via
our visual senses, mapi, the tactile stimulus, map2 , the olfactory stimulus, map3 .
Now the map that forms between map! and map2 is a reentrant maps. These
reentrant maps provide the basis of our recognition for association between things;
they also form the basis for pattern recognition and recognition of the salient feature
of a thing. Nervous system of individuals are different in different individuals.
The structure of the nervous system is different in different individuals due to
the variety of neuronal groups (selected through randomness), synaptic responses,
reinforcement of maps; thus each nervous system is unique. The neurons in charge
of perception created by reentrant loops provide perceptual categorization of the
immediate present. Value-category memory, a special feature of the nervous system
which is located in the frontal, temporal, and parietal cortex of the human brain,
assigns value to this perceptual categorization and in the next state we reach belief
states for which these values are intrinsic. The value category memory stores our
rules of concepts usage and when this memory loop gets attached to the perceptual
categorization we reach belief states. We are then aware of our surroundings; we
recognize entities as X’s or as an Y’s. Memory loop stores the rule of concept-usage,
acquired in the past and applies them to the present perceptual categorization. As
this loop is responsible for our conceptual categorization
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or belief states, Edelman terms the latter, “remembered present”. This memory,
where the rule of concept-usage is stored, is achieved through classification and
reclassification of reentrant loops between different clusters of neuronal groups ac-
cording to the adaptation to the environment achieved by our behavior/response to
external stimuli. Our value-category memory stores the rule for concept usage (e.g.
whale usage, apple-usage) and endows value or meaning to these reentrant loops5
.
Inference, I contend, is a causal transition from one belief state to the next.
Mere causal transition is nothing more than connection between one reentrant loop
and another; such transition can be explained by the laws of biology. When value
category memory regulates and puts constraints upon these reentrant loops (i.e.,
when belief states are formed) the transition process instantiates inferential patterns6 .
Such regulations are obtained by the usage of concept rule, involved within these
belief states, in natural language. In all cases of inference the derived states are
well-grounded on the basis states.
An important question remains to be answered with regard to propositions and
beliefs that I eventually import into my ontology: if inference is a transition between
belief states, what is the function of beliefs as propositions? In other words, what
is the point in bringing propositions into our ontology? Beliefs have propositional
contents. The content of P’s belief is the proposition that Jones owns a Ford, which S
takes to be true. In contrast, the content of P’s belief is that the apple is red, which
P takes to be true. Beliefs are individuated by their content: S s and P’s beliefs
are different as the contents of these two beliefs are different. Millar (1991) says
that beliefs with different contents are different types of beliefs. If S and P, however,
believe the same things, their beliefs would be of the same type. If, for example, S
5
I have borrowed the phrase “value-category memory” from Edelman (1992).
6 As I show in chapter 4, I follow a regulative theory of inference as opposed to a reliability
theory
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and P both believed that Jones owns a Ford
,
their beliefs would be of the same type;
they would, however, differ quantitatively as they are beliefs of two different people.
To quote Millar,
If Kate’s belief B is the belief that p and Fred’s belief B' is the belief that q,
and the proposition that p is not the same as the proposition that q, then B
and B' are different beliefs in the sense of being different belief-types. This
regiments the common-sense thought that people have the same belief only if
what they believe is the same.
Different belief states, in contrast to beliefs, are not of different types; thus, Ss
belief state (believing an apple to be there) or P’s belief state (believing Jones to
own a Ford) are not different types of belief states, but are belief states of different
types. The primary difference between beliefs as propositional and belief states is
that the former, unlike the latter, can be true or false. What makes beliefs true or
false are their contents; contents do not perform the same function in belief states. Of
course, each of these states necessarily has a content, or is focused on a proposition,
and a person in that state must have a concept involved in, or appropriate to, that
content. But the state is not thereby true or false; these properties belong to the
state’s content or the proposition it is focused upon. Nonetheless, these states do
not have the properties of their content. Two token beliefs may be generically the
same, that is, both might have the same content, but they may be causally different.
Belief states are physical states and are causally efficacious. In the above case, P’s
belief state (Jones owning a Ford) is sustained by belief states such as the following:
P believing that Mary was right when she said that Jones owns a Ford (after all
she is a close friend of Jones), P believing that Mary does not usually lie, and so
on. Suppose S is also in the same belief state (Jones owing a Ford) which can be
sustained by the following belief state: Jones has given S rides many times; S has
seen Jones driving the car out of his garage for the last fifteen years since he moved
into the neighbourhood, etc. So the causal ancestry of S' s and P’s belief states are
different.
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In chapter 5 I propose to deal more fully with the question why we need to bring
in propositions into our ontology; here I give only a brief answer. It is possible
to conceive of a distinction between (1) thinking about a thought (2) thinking a
thought. I may think that the weather is good. In this case, the latter proposition
(the weather is good) is the content of my thought which has a truth value, i.e., is
either true or false. In contrast to this, I may also think about the above thought
as follows: ‘The first thought that I had this morning’. The latter thought, unlike
the former, has no truth-value, for it has no distinct content; in other words, it is
non-propositional thinking. Thinking, as I show in chapter 5, has a language of
thought which is non-propositional. The question, then, is, “Why do we have to
import propositions into our ontology?” Thinking, as established in recent years,
proceeds by way of defeasible or default reasoning7
. In this kind of reasoning, we
hypothesize something as a reason for another thing. As our thinking proceeds, we
gather further evidence which may falsify our previous hypothesis. In order to think
of the previous hypothesis as false we have to view it in terms of its contents, for only
contentful statements (or propositions) are true or false. Thus, as I show in chapter
5, we have to import beliefs (propositions) into our ontology because of defeasible
or default reasoning.
To summarize, a belief state is a state of primary consciousness with recognition
as its intrinsic feature. Inference consists of causal transitions from one belief state
(state of primary consciousness) to the next. Such a transition is guided by the rules
of concept-usage involved within these states. In order to develop this idea, a theory
of concept-acquisition has to be introduced; I do so in the next chapter.
7 Reiter (1978), Doyle (1979) and McDermott (1980).
CHAPTER 3
Concepts and Concept-acquisition
My aim in this chapter is to consider the following questions: (1) What conditions
must be fulfilled for S to have the concept of Z? And (2) What role does a concept
play in the transition process from one belief state to another? Belief states, in
biological terms, are reentrant loops and has a natural disposition to pass to other
belief states. When such transitions follow proper usage of concepts involved within
these states, an inferential pattern is instantiated.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In section 1 I distinguish between
a truth-conditional theory and an operational theory of concepts 1 and show why I
adopt the latter instead of the former. According to the truth-conditional view,
concepts are individuated by their inferential roles; according to the operational view,
concepts are individuated by their everyday usage in natural language. In section
2 I critically survey the three models that are generally put forward to explain how
we use rules that govern the use of concepts. These models are as follows: the
intellectual model, the third person model, and the competence/action model. At
the end of this section I review, very briefly, the subdoxastic status of the rules
governing concept-usage.
3.1 Concepts: Logical Role vs. Role in Practical Reasoning
According to the truth-conditional view, as Millar observes (1991), a concept is
individuated by its inferential role (p. 71.). Each concept, according to this view,
Mhe word “operational” is used in AI.
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is a component of a network. Patterns of legitimate inferences individuate concepts:
Thus a subject, S
,
possesses the concept Z, according to the truth-conditional view,
only if S has mastered the inferential patterns by which Z is individuated. According
to this view, S possesses the concepts of ‘spinster’, for example, only if S can make
the following sort of inference: Linda is a spinster; therefore, Linda is an unmarried
female
. S can also make the following inference regarding spinster: ‘Linda is a
spinster; therefore Linda owns several cats.’
The chief distinctions between these two inference are as follows: (1) In the first
inference spinster’ is partly individuated by a analytic inference and in the second
inference ‘spinster’ is partly individuated by a non-analytic inference. (2) While the
first one is purely formal, the second one is not 3 . One possible objection to the above
theory of concepts has been raised by Dummett’s followers. The objection stems from
Dummett’s (1978) ‘Inextricability thesis’ (IT) 4 . Dummett, following Quine, says
that one cannot make a strict distinction between concepts that are individuated
by analytic inference and those that are not. Such distinction rests, as Dummett
says, on the analytic-synthetic distinction which, as Quine has shown, is spurious.
According to IT, convention and experience cannot be separated from each other as
being determinants of our linguistic dispositions. Dummett says, “It is this thesis
which underlies Quine’s substitution of stimulus-analyticity for analyticity and of
2The reverse, I contend, is also true, although Millar (1991) does not say so.
3One could also say that in the first inference the conclusion, Linda is an unmarried female
,
follows from the premises without any undischarged assumption. In this sense, the premise, Linda
is a spinster
,
is a conclusive reason for thinking that Linda is an unmarried female. No propositions
other than Linda is a spinster is needed to derive the conclusion that Linda is an unmarried female.
In the second case, the conclusion requires one requires some additional assumptions to go from
the premise to the conclusion such as, “All spinsters are neurotic”; “all neurotic people own cats.”
Of course I realize that these particular assumptions are not the only ones. As Professor Aune
pointed out to me, however, that almost all concepts can be individuated by inferences without
further assumptions.
4
I realize that not all philosophers will agree with this; nonetheless, this is, I contend, an
important point that should be mentioned here.
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stimulus-synonymity for intuitive synonymity; it consists in the doctrine that no
distinction is possible in principle between an analytic sentence generally recognized
as such and any other sentence generally accepted as true” (p. 388). According
to IT, there are no reliable criteria by which we can distinguish between inferences
which are purely analytic and those which are not. Millar (1991) claims, however,
that the difference between these two sorts of inferences can be explained by using
the notion of conceptual truth. Clearly, the first generates conceptual truth, says
Millar; the second does not.
Gareth Evans (1982) showed that the notion of conceptual truth is problematic.
For example, owning a cat’ may be part of T's concept of being a ‘spinster’, but
it may not be part of P's concept of a ‘spinster 1
. Accordingly, the inference ‘5* is a
spinster; hence, S owns several cats’ will generate a conceptual truth for T but not for
P
.
The other point is that ‘owning cats’ was part of P's concept of ‘being a spinster’
in the 1920s, but it is not so in the 1990’s. So the inference ‘S' is a spinster; hence, S
owns several cats’ generated a conceptual truth for P in 1920 but it does not do so
for P now. Another good example is the concept of ‘whale’. While ‘being a mammal’
was not part of S”s concept of ‘whale’ in 1920’s, it is now a part of his concept. So
the inference pattern ‘X is a whale; hence, X is a mammal’ was non-analytic in the
1920’s but is not so now. What this shows is that our concept acquisition has to
take note of two things: (1) that individual psychology is different and (2) the fact
that language is not static but dynamic and that meaning constantly changes. So
substantive features of concepts have to be accommodated in any reasoning.
Quine said that to generate ‘conceptual truth’ we need to consider only the formal
features of a concept. If that is true then the only inferences allowed by Quine
would be those in which the premises entail the conclusion. For if we consider only
the formal features of a concept, as suggested by Quine, a concept, in that case,
is a reason for another concept only if the former entails the latter. In ordinary
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everyday reasoning, however, we have to take account of non-conclusive reasonings
and Quine’s thesis would be too narrow to apply in cases of such reasoning. Further,
a premise can be a reason for a conclusion without entailing it.
In recent times Goodman (1955) has shown that we cannot consider only the
formal feature of a concept. For, Goodman argues, we cannot make a distinction,
crucial to induction, between a “projectible” 5 and a “non-projectible” concept by
appealing only to their formal features. Goodman’s notion of “projectible concepts”
arose from his solution to what he called the “new” problem of induction. He posed
this problem by constructing artificial predicates like “grue” and “bleen”
. Goodman
defined ‘grue’ as follows:
• X is grue =def X is green and examined before the year 2000 or blue and
examined afterwards.
Similarly, Goodman defined ‘bleen’ as follows:
• X is bleen = def X is blue and examined before the 2000 or green and examined
afterwards
Suppose we observe all emeralds before the year 2000 and reach the conclusion
that “all emeralds are green” . By the same observation we can also reach the general
conclusion “all emeralds are grue” (according to Goodman’s definition). Both these
generalizations seem quite reasonable. The problem, however, arises with the color
of emeralds examined after the year 2000. Suppose E is an emerald which will
be examined by individuals after the year 2000. Now, we can say of E that it is
green and also that it is blue (as everything green is by definition also grue) or
not-green. Clearly, this is a self-contradiction. As Pollock (1986) observes, the
formal feature of the pairs ‘blue’ and ‘green’ and ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ are symmetrical,
5 This is Goodman’s word.
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but their substantive features are not. Hence, a distinction between projectibles and
non-projectibles cannot be made by appealing to their formal features; we have to
take note of their substantive features as well.
The above theory of concept-acquisition, also known as the truth-conditional
theory, is clearly problematic. I propose to replace the above theory of concept
acquisition with the Operational Theory of Concepts. According to this theory,
having a concept is an ability to use words, something other than themselves:
knowing how to use a concept. S
,
for example, has the concept of X if, as Pollock
(1976) says, S knows an X when he sees one (p. 13.). According to the latter view,
concepts are not only categories whose interrelationships are purely formal; they are
also categories in terms of which we think of the world. Under what conditions does
S have, according to this theory, the concept of, say, a whale? S has the concept of a
whale only when a set of conditions, say C, that uniquely determine the justification
condition of the concept of whale, is fulfilled. In contrast to this, S has the concept
of an apple when a different set of condition, call it C\ is fulfilled. What are C and
C"? C is the condition which being fulfilled enables S to know a whale when he sees
one; C' is the condition which being fulfilled enables S to know an apple when he
sees one6 .
Let us see what an operational theory of concepts is by distinguishing between
the truth-conditional role and the conceptual role of a concept 7 . The concept of
whale plays a truth-conditional role in the inference, “Willy is a whale; hence, Willy
is a mammal”. This role of the concept of whale makes it a mere logical category
whose interrelationship to other concepts (such as being a mammal) can be studied
by logic that takes note only of the formal feature of a concept. We have seen in
Goodman’s case, however, that in all non-conclusive reasoning we have to take note
6 Pollock says that this is not the literal sense of ‘seeing’.
7 This is a term I have borrowed from Pollock (1986).
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of both the formal features of a concept and also their substantive features. Thus,
we must take account of not only the truth-conditional role of a concept, but also
its conceptual role. The concept of whale plays a conceptual role for S when S can
apply it properly and can distinguish it from a non-whale (say shark or dolphin).
As Pollock (1976) says, one knows a 0 when he can identify a 0 as a 0 and exclude
it from its complement or non
-0 (p. 14). S has, in this case, learned the rule of the
usage of the concept of whales in natural language8
.
Reasoning or Inference, as I showed in the last chapter, is a causal transition
of one belief-state to another. In addition, such transition is not arbitrary but
meaningful. Meaning in each case is provided by the rules of concept usage in each
belief state; rules constitute the semantics of these states. One who has acquired
the rules of concept usage has also acquired the conceptual roles of concepts in
natural language. We have seen above that according to the truth conditional notion
of concept acquisition, to have a concept of a whale is to be able to make certain
inferential connection between whale and its ingredient component. For concepts,
according to this view, are components of networks, and to grasp a concept is to
grasp its network. For example, having a concept of whale is knowing some related
propositions such as “whales are mammals”. But any person, say S
,
must have the
concept of whale in the sense of having acquired the conceptual roles of that concept
before being able to articulate these contingent fact about whales. Let us suppose
that S is a marine biologist and knows a lot of contingent facts about whales. Now,
S, as Pollock observes, must have known a whale to be a whale before acquiring all
these contingent facts, otherwise he would not know a whale when he is examining
it. This is the notion of concept that I am applying here.
8The subject may not be able to utter the word ‘whale’, for he may not know English.
Nonetheless, I assume that he has a concept of whale if he is able to identify it as being the
same creature as whale and not as a shark or porpoise.
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While simple concepts (such as the concept of a whale) can be known by an
individual ostensively 9
,
a complicated concepts can be known by him only if he
knows their ingredient simple concepts. The term “ostensive”, as used here, has
a sense which is similar to its usage in ostensive definition. Suppose S wants to
define the term ‘cat’. One way he can do so is by pointing to a real cat and saying
‘cat!’. Similarly, one can acquire other concepts by having an instance of the concept
pointed out in the real world; we can say that he knows the justification condition
of a cat. As Pollock (1976) says, “When you use an ostensive definition to teach
a person a concept, what you are teaching him is how to judge whether something
is an instance of that concept” (p. 15). Complex concepts, on the other hand,
cannot be learned ostensively. A mammal (concept of a kind), ‘being taller than’
(concept of being a relation), or the concept of ‘being patriotic’ (abstract concept)
are examples of complex concepts. Complex concepts like that of a mammal are
divisible into simpler concepts like ‘being an animal’ and ‘suckling their young’.
Once these simpler concepts are grasped, a child can build up complicated concepts.
Suppose uj is a complex concept; it consists of the concepts of and . Then to
know the justification condition of u>
,
we must know the justification concept of 0
and . As Pollock says,
One concept may be defined verbally in terms of some other concepts, and
those concepts in turn defined in terms of some further concepts, and so on,
but this cannot go on indefinitely. We cannot define all concepts verbally
without going around in a circle. Our sequence of verbal definitions must
eventually terminate with some concepts that can be defined ostensively.
Furthermore, if the concept of a is verbally defined in terms of some concepts
4>i to <f>n , which are in turn verbally defined in terms of some concepts
then by putting all of the definitions together we can obtain a definition of
0 in terms of 0i...0n . Consequently, if a concept can be defined by means
of a sequence of verbal definitions which terminate ultimately with ostensive
concepts, then can be defined directly in terms of ostensive concepts. This
means that there are in general two kinds of concepts — those that can be
9 This is a phrase I have borrowed from Pollock [1974].
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defined ostensively, and those that can be defined verbally in terms of others
(P- 15.)
One problem arises at this point. It might be the case, as Pollock says, that the
justification condition of u consist of 0 and nobody knows whether it also can be
defined in terms of 0 . As a result, Pollock says, under no conditions is S justified in
thinking of something that it is u . Pollock says, “The justification conditions of the
concept of a a; constitute the null class. Under these circumstances, it would not be
true that to know what a u; is is to know how to determine whether something is a
uj . It seems that in this case, to know what a w is would be something like knowing
the definition of aw and having the concepts involved in the definition. Thus we
cannot conclude that the concept of a u; is uniquely determined by the justification
conditions of it and its complement” (p. 16).
The above theory of concepts has some problems. First of all, it may be objected
that one can identify a whale as whale only if one knows the truth conditions of
whale. To this objection we can reply as follows: that a truth conditional definition
is not common among ordinary speakers of English, although it is possible that
lexicographers might be able to construct it (Pollock, 1974 p. 14).
Moreover, it can be argued that although a person can identify a whale without
knowing what makes a whale a whale
,
he can do the identifying just when the
truth-conditions are satisfied; hence, knowing the truth-condition of a concept is a
prerequisite for identifying it. The problem with this prerequisition is that it makes
the conditions too stringent. Does S, who wrongly identifies a plastic whale as a
whale, possess the concept of a whale? Does a child, who wrongly identifies a shark
as a whale, possess the concept of the latter? It can be replied that owing to the
similarity between the plastic whale and the real whale, S has applied the concept
of whale to the plastic whale; this does not, however, preclude him from having the
concept of whale in the above sense. In the second case, the child was perhaps not
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paying attention to what he was identifying and hence he did not identify the whale
correctly; nonetheless, in this case, he had the concept of whales. Further, as I said
before, concepts are dynamic entities and they are known within a frame of reference.
Gradually the child learns that whales are things which cannot be displayed in toy
shops, his original concept of whale changes; he knows now what frame of reference
is unsuitable for whales. In general, having conceptual knowledge, S must be able
to ascribe concepts. In all cases, when S can rightly judge and identify a whale as
a whale, we can say that he has acquired the concept of whale. As Pollock (1974)
remarks, “ This is knowledge in the practical sense rather than theoretical knowledge.
The child must know how to ascribe the concept to things justifiably, but he need
not know what is required for his ascription of it to be justified” (p. 15.).
What is the meaning of a concept according to the above theory? According to
the operational theory, the meaning of “whale” is determined by the rules of its usage.
Hence, one who has learned the rules of “whale” -usage has also learned the meaning
of whale in natural language. In this sense, rules of concept usage constitute the
meaning of that concept; there is nothing deeper about meaning than this. In order
to fully appreciate this theory, we have to understand two relevant questions: (1)
How do we learn to use concepts in natural language? And (2) What does proper
concept usage mean? These are the question that we consider in the next section.
3.2 Epistemic Rules and Their Function
I said in the previous section that proper concept-usage are instantiated in some
cases of belief-transition; the latter cases illustrate our notion of inference. But
the question remains, how are these rules used? Generally three models have been
suggested in order to illustrate the rules of concept-usage. These model are the
Intellectual model, the Evaluative model, and the Competence/Performance model.
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According to the first model, rules of concept-usage are explicitly articulated
propositions. A good example is a driver’s manual. It tells us exactly what to do
when we see a stop sign, a yield sign, or a flashing red light. When people first
start driving and are not sure how to use these rules, they can always check the
explicitly written regulation in the driving manual. This is propositional knowledge
or knowledge that something is the case. According to the second model, rules are
used to evaluate other people’s behavior. The problem with both these models is
that neither of them shows how rules govern our speech or language. My contention
is that the third model above is appropriate to describe how rules actually work in
guiding our linguistic behavior and actions.
Rules of driving, for example, govern our behavior. We refer to manuals when we
first learn how to drive. As an expert driver we do not think explicitly of these rules;
nonetheless, our behavior is guided by them. Driving is an ability or competence:
it is a knowledge ‘how’. The case of swimming is similar. When we first learn
to swim, we follow the explicit instructions given to us by the instructor. As we
become experts, however, our behavior automatically conforms to the rules without
our having to think of them. Pollock says that when we “ undertake to do X,
our behavior is automatically channeled into that plan.” (p. 130.). Our linguistic
or conceptual abilities are similar to our ability to drive or swim; they constitute
a description of this plan for swimming or driving, or speaking a language. Rules
guide our behavior; we can apply them, correct them, and refine them. We do not,
however, always follow these rules correctly, but we TRY to do, as Pollock (1986)
says, with varying degrees of success (p. 128) 10 .
To summarize what I have said above, there is a vast difference between knowing a
rule in the sense of knowing some propositions and being guided by a rule. Thus, our
10The same thing can be explained by saying that when we learn a language, we learn its rules,
but we do not always apply or use them correctly.
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ability (to swim or drive) consists in our behavior being automatically channeled into
following rules. The crucial thing here is that these rules are internalized by us — we
do not have to think of them when we perform the relevant action. This knowledge
consists in doing things as the situation arises. Thus, 5, for example, knows the
concept of a, say, Z only if S knows a Z to be a Z when certain conditions are
fulfilled: there is a Z in the environment. According to this theory, if the condition
of there being a whale is fulfilled, S retrieves the rules of concept usage (in this case
it is the concept of whale) from his short-term or occurrent memory and applies
it in that particular case and concludes that it is an instance of whale 11
. Memory,
as I pointed out before, is not a data-bit storage of a computer which is static and
unequivocal; it is biological and is dynamic. There is a phenomenal change in S s
experience as S recognizes the whale 12 .
As Pollock (1986) observes,
Having procedural knowledge of what to do under various circumstances does
not involve being able to give a general description of what we should do under
those circumstances. This is the familiar observation that knowing how to
ride a bicycle does not automatically enable one to write a treatise on bicycle
riding. This is true for two different reasons. First, knowing how to ride
a bicycle requires us to know what to do in each situation as it arises
,
but
it does not require us to be able to say what we should do before the fact.
Second, even when a situation has actually arisen, our knowing what to do in
that situation need not be propositional knowledge. In the case of knowing
that we should turn the handlebars to the right when bicycle leans to the
right, it is plausible to suppose that most bicycle riders do have propositional
knowledge of this; but consider knowing how to hit a tennis ball with a tennis
racket. I know what to do — as the situation unfolds, at each instant I know
what to do — but even at that instant I cannot give a description of what I
should do. Knowing what to do is the same thing as knowing to do it, and
that need not involve propositional knowledge. (129-30).
The important question now is, what constitutes the justification of these rules?
5, for example, might use a concept guided by his rules, while Y might use the
n
I explain this more fully with the help of de dicto and de re representation of concepts.
12As I will show in the next chapter how this happens.
41
same concept differently guided by his rules, and both might argue that they have
their own notion of which rules are appropriate. Are we not heading for a thorough
relativism? One can, of course, justify these rules with reference to some other
rules. The question, then, would be as follows: “What is the justification of the
latter rules? As Strawson observes (1952), when we have questioned so much that
there are no more rules left by reference to which we can justify any rules, we have
leached the limit of justification. Following Feigl, we can draw a distinction between
“validation” and “vindication” of rules. As Salmon (1957) says, “A rule of inference
can be validated by showing that it can be derived from other accepted rules or
principles. There is, however, a second form of justification called “vindication”.
This form of justification consists in showing that a given decision, policy, or act
is well adapted to achieving a certain end” (p. 39). Our aim is to achieve correct
usage of ordinary discourse and to be able to communicate and make sense within our
linguistic community. Flence, the rules we use should be the ones directed towards
this end. Given any rule, r, of concept usage, it is permissible to use r if it is not
forbidden to do so; in other words, it is permissible to use r if it contributes to
sensible discourse which is true for all speakers. Here we justify r in relation to a
norm or a standard — our ability to learn the use of concepts in ordinary discourse.
3.2.1 Rules as Subdoxastic
I close this chapter with a brief estimate of the nature of rules of concept-usage as
being subdoxastic. What exactly, one may ask, is a subdoxastic state? The following
example from grammatical rules will make the notion clear. Suppose that S', who is
an adult and a competent speaker of English, is storing the grammatical rule that ‘s’
should be added with the verb following any third person singular noun. Let us call
this grammatical rule r. Further, suppose that S believes r to be correct; we can say
that S is in the belief state Bsr . The first one is a state (which stores the information
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r) and the other is the belief state that r is true. Suppose S believes that no rules
r have characteristic C\ then if S encounters r having C, he will conclude that it
is false that it is r. If Bsr is the belief state whose content is S believes that r and
r is the rule stored by S ' s language processing mechanism then, as Stitch (1978) 13
says, Bsr and the subdoxastic state r will not cause the belief state that some thing
is not r. To arrive at the conclusion we need the additional belief state B
sri ; the
latter is that S believes that r to be true, which is distinct from the rule r. As
Stitch observes, It would be easy enough to marshall many more illustrations of
the fact that the subdoxastic states which store grammatical information are largely
inferentially isolated from beliefs.” (p. 509). There is, of course, some resemblance
between the subdoxastic state and the states which contain information about it.
Stitch says, Saying that a state in an information processing system represents the
information (or fact) p is to say that the state bears some interesting resemblancesu
to the belief that p" (p. 510).
Gilbert Harman (1973) refuses to believe that there are subdoxastic states which
play any role in our inferences; all we have in inferences, Harman contends, are
beliefs interconnected with each other. One test will show that he is wrong. Suppose
experimenter P asks subject S, who is a competent speaker of English language
and is willing to cooperate, to label two sentences a and b with two tags g and
ug. Sentence ‘a
1
reads “Mary goes to Church” and sentence b reads, “Mary go to
Church” 15
;
‘g’ stands for grammatical and ‘ug’ stands for ungrammatical. Now S
successfully tags ‘g’ to sentence a and ‘ug’ to b. When asked what is his reason for
doing so, S cannot reply for he does not know why he reached the conclusion: he
13 Stitch uses the word ‘belief’; I have substituted it with belief states.
14
Italics mine.
15 This is not to be taken as an imperitive statement; it is an assertive statement.
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simply believes it, 16
. One may point out that S arrived at the conclusion with the
additional belief state B sp (
S
believing p to be true, where p stands for the rule all
verbs following third person singular nouns should have an s). As I said before, B sp
is a state whose content is that r is correct, but it is not the state r; the latter, I
contend, is not a belief state; nonetheless, we use r in our inferences. Now imagine
that r is a not a grammatical rule but a rule of concept usage. One who has the
competence to use a concept stores the rule for its usage, and this is distinct from
the belief that the rule is true. These rules are used in all inferences by all competent
speaker of language.
To summarize what I said in this chapter, acquiring or learning a concept is to
learn its proper application in natural language. Such learning involves acquisition
of the rules of concept usage. These rules are not propositional; they are internal-
ized goal-oriented subdoxastic states that guide our thought and linguistic behavior
and when properly used these rules instantiate inference patterns which validate
transitions from one belief state to another.
16 Stitch says that one can say that it is an unconscious belief; hence, S cannot articulate it. The
whole theory of the unconscious is hypothetical and is therefore one which should be best avoided.
CHAPTER 4
Nature of Experience: Top-Down vs.
Bottom-Up Information Processing
My primary aim in this chapter is to show that like belief states experiential
states also contain elements of recognition. The chief difference between the two,
however, as I show here, is that while the element of recognition is an intrinsic
part of any belief state, it is not so in case of experiential state. In this chapter I
show that experience, like recognition, is essentially (to use a phrase from cognitive
psychology) “bottom up information processing.”
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In section 1 I present the views
of McGinn (1982), Peacocke (1983), and Searle (1982). The central theme of these
views is that there can be no pre-cognitive experience: experience is intrinsically
meaningful. I argue against these views in this section by bringing in a typology of
experience 1 . In section 2 I present the notion of “bottom-up information processing”
in experience. I end this section by briefly criticizing the Extreme Perceptual View
according to which there is nothing in experiential states besides their representa-
tional content2 .
4.1 Experience is Intrinsically Meaningful: McGinn, Peacocke, Searle
Following Edelman (1992) in chapter 1 I have presented my view of belief states.
According to this view, belief states are not only physical or biological states (reentrant
T have borrowed the phrase “typology of experience” from Millar [1991].
2 This is a phrase I have borrowed from Peacocke [1983].
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maps) but are also meaningful states. Like physical states generally, belief states
are causally efficacious; they sustain other belief states. The transition from one
belief state to another can be captured by causal/biological laws. But sometimes
such transitions, in addition to instantiating causal laws, also follow proper usage of
concept involved within these states. The rules of usage of a concept, as I showed in
the previous chapter, constitute the meaning of that concept and hence make those
belief states meaningful. According to the this theory, recognition is a necessary part
of belief states. Thus, say, recognizing an X as an A is a necessary or intrinsic part
of ^s belief state that an X is there.
Expei iential states, I contend, are species of mental states: they are conscious
occurrences. According to the convention I am following, P can describe 5”s exper-
ience as its seeming to S that X is there” 3
. In the latter case, X is a schematic
letter which stands for the content of the experience and can be replaced by words
for tables, chairs, birds, etc. P can describe &s belief state as “His state is that of
its seeming to him that a bird is there”
. The latter experiential state in S, I contend,
need not be caused by an actual bird. Experiential states have to be distinguished
from the following mental states: perceptual states, sensations, judgements, and
belief states. Experiential states differ from perception so far as the latter, unlike
the former, have to be caused by some actual objects. My perception of a bird on
3 As a result of my discussion with Professor Aune I came up with this formulation which, he
pointed out to me, is similar to “my feeling sad” and “her being a teacher”, which are all nouns.
Millar (1991) prefers to describe such experiences as “such that it seems to S that an F is there”.
Aune (1993) criticizes Millar as follows: “the pronoun in ‘the experience is such that it seems that an
Fis there’ is grammatically unrelated to the preceding noun. A careless reader might suppose that
Millar is thinking of the experience as creating the impression that an F is there, but this supposition
is ruled out by Millar’s claim that ‘it seems to S that p' means no more than ‘S would believe that p
so long as S believes there are no countervailing facts’ Obviously this claim disallowes a causal
interpretation because the truth of the ‘would’ statement does not require anything to occur when
the subject believes there are countervailing factors. An unconnected disposition is not adequate,
anyway, for one could have such a disposition when no F even appears to be there — when, say,
a trusted friend has assured one that an F is there but one is unable to detect it. If one has an
experience of an F, one’s F-type experience should have some effect on one’s consciousness ”
(p. 241).
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the window sill, for example, must be caused by an actual bird on the window sill.
I can, however, experience a bird on the window sill even if there is no bird on the
window sill to cause my experience. Moreover, experiences differ from sensations
like itches, tickles, and feeling of numbness (Millar p. 10) which have no distinct
contents. Furthermore, the content of an experience is not the same as the content
of a judgment. As Peacocke (1983) says, someone might judge that there is a picture
of a violin painted in oil on the door; the latter then is the content of his judgment.
It is, however, not the content of his experience; he may have an experience as of a
violin hanging on the door although he still judges it as a painted violin.
Experiential states thus differ from belief states; yet, in some ways, they are
similar. Like belief states, experiential states are causally efficacious; they causally
sustain belief states. The difference between these two states is very crucial, however.
As I said earlier, S can be in a state of believing a red apple to be on the table only
if, S has acquired the usage of the concepts “apple” and “red” in ordinary language.
Thus, to be in any belief state, S
,
the subject, must have learned the rules of using A,
or any appropriate concept, involved within that state. So the relationship between
a belief state and the mastery of the rules of its ingrediant concept is essential.
Further, according to the operational theory of concepts, the rules of concept usage
constitute the meaning of a concept; hence, belief states are always meaningful and
interpreted. On the other hand, the relation between an experiential state and the
rules of concept usage is contingent and not necessary. S can experience an X
without having acquired the rules of the X-usage in ordinary language. In this sense,
the element of recognition (interpretation) is not a necessary part of experience, it is
a contingent part. All philosophers, however, do not agree with this view. McGinn,
Searle, and Peacocke think that experience is essentially interpreted as the experience
of something. Their formulation of the thesis is, however, different, and I expound
their views in the next few paragraphs.
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I said before that S may have an experience of a bird on the window sill; following
the locution I used earlier, P can describe S s experience as “its seeming to S that
a bird is there”. The content of S"s experience is the bird. McGinn (1982) in
his book, Character of the Mind
,
says that in the above case S is experiencing
something as a bird
;
the latter is what his experience is about and is an intrinsic
part of his experiential state. McGinn further observes that in cases of hallucination
we also experience something as, say, a book, or a table, which is the content of
our experience. In such cases experiential states, according to him, do not have
any objects
;
nonetheless, they have contents. The contents are what the experiencer
experiences things as. Thus, in general, all experiences are interpreted as being of
something and hence are meaningful states for McGinn.
Peacocke (1983) holds that experiences represent things to be in a certain way.
A visual experience may be represented to S' as of a writing table with a pencil
and paper on it. The representational content of an experience, says Peacocke, is
given by a proposition or a set of propositions. In the above cases, the content of
S s experience can be expressed as the proposition “that there is table before me
with pen and paper on it.” Peacocke says, “... it is in the nature of representational
content that it cannot be built from concepts unless the subject of the experience
himself has those concepts: the representational content is the way the experience
presents the world as being, and it can hardly present the world as being that way if
the subject is incapable of appreciating what that way is. Only those with the concept
of sphere can have an experience as of a sphere in front of them, and only those with
spatial concepts can have experiences which represent things as distributed in depth
in space” (p. 7). So, for Peacocke, the representational content of an experience is
intrinsic to that experience.
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The Adequacy Thesis4 should be mentioned in this context. The gist of this
thesis is that two experiences which represent the world in two different ways are
different types of experiences. S', for example, might be in the experiential state
(e-i) which P can describe as “its seeming to S that a table is there”; the content
of this state can be expressed as the proposition that there is a table. P might also
describe S' s experiential state (e-2) as “its seeming to S that an apple is there”; the
content of this state can be expressed by the “proposition that there is an apple”
.
E-l and E-2 have different contents; hence, they are different types of experiential
states. It follows that contents of experiential states determine their types (Adequacy
Thesis). According to Peacocke, the Adequacy Thesis implies much stronger view
that experiential states have nothing more than their representational content. The
latter view is known as the Extreme Perceptual View.
According to Searle (1983), all our experiences have a common feature: direc-
tedness. Ss visual experience of a bird is directed towards a bird, his auditory
experience of rain falling is directed towards rain falling; they are, we can also say,
experiences of a bird and of rain falling. So experience is always an “experience
of”. Experience, to use Searle’s phrase, is intentional. Hence, experience is always
interpretative: the element of recognition is necessarily its part. According to Searle,
this fact can be demonstrated by showing that it is true even in cases of hallucination.
If S experiences a flying saucer in the sky, it is the flying saucer at which his
experience is directed even though there is no real flying saucer in the external
world. Searle says that experiences are similar to sensations in so far as both have
durations; while sensations are pleasant or unpleasant, experiences are intentional.
To summarize what I have said above, according to McGinn, Searle, and Pea-
cocke, to experience is always to experience something as something. Experiences, as
mental states, are, in this view, essentially interpreted and hence they are meaningful.
4 This is a name given by Peacocke.
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Contrary to the above view, I contend that a subject, S
,
need not always exper-
ience things as an X or as a T; in other words, recognition is not an essential or
an intrinsic part of experiential states — it is an extrinsic part of them. In order
to show that recognition is an extrinsic part of experiential states, I present here
two principles: (1) The Principle of Typology of Experience5 and (2) The Principle
of Phenomenal Character. To understand the Principle of Typology of Experience
,
it is useful to think of pains in relation to the causal circumstances in which they
are produced. Thus a pain produced by burning is different from that produced
by cutting one’s finger on a sharp knife. We often talk about the pain of the type
produced by burning, or of the type produced by cutting one‘s hand on the knife,
thus regimenting pains according to their causal circumstances. There is, as Millar
observes, no way of getting around causes of pains which are publicly observable
(p. 26). Classifying pains according to causal circumstances, however, does not
give us the knowledge of the phenomenal character of that pain. As Millar says,
“Knowing that a pain is of the type produced when/if such and such occurs is not
yet to know which type it is Specifications conforming to our regimented form
merely indicate the type of pain but do not describe its phenomenal character” (p.
26). The fundamental thought here is that there is a basic distinction between having
a pain of a certain type and being able to describe that pain as being of such and
such a type. Thus S can have a pain of the type when a cold drink affects a bad
tooth; he may not, however, be able to describe that pain as of the above type to P.
On the other hand, suppose S has the ability to describe (verbally) a certain pain
as being of the type when cold (e.g., burning sensation) affects a bad tooth, P may
understand S' s words, but P may not be able to fully grasp them as he had never
experienced such a type of pain. As Millar says, we would not grasp the statement
5 This is a phrase I have borrowed from Millar [1991].
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that a man is of the type who wears shirt with a polo neck and drives a Volvo if we
do not know what type of man he is (p. 27.).
Next, let us consider the Principle of Phenomenal Character. According to
this principle, pains can be of same type yet appear to a subject as phenomenally
different. We describe headaches, for example, as being of dull type, or of throbbing
type. These are same types of pains, yet they are phenomenally different. By
contrast, some pains can be both phenomenally different and of different pain-types;
examples would be pains produced by a sharp knife and pains produced by burning.
Let us next apply the typology of experience to sense-experiences in general.
Ordinarily, we speak of having an experience of the type produced when we touch
silk, or of the type produced when we touch a rough edge, or of type produced when
someone runs past us. Let us call such experiences X-type, T-type, or Z-type. The
first two are in the modality of touch and the last one in the modality of sight. X-type
experiences are those that Xs yield when the subject is in a suitable position and
his sense of seeing, hearing, touching is normal (Millar p. 28). Thus, we can have
a (red apple)-type experience (in visual modality), (rushing-water)-type experience
(in auditory modality), etc. Millar says, “A grasp of the typology is implicit in our
ordinary talk of the appearances of things relative to various modalities. This is to
say it is implicit in our ordinary talk of the look, or sound, or feel, or smell, or taste
of things” (p. 30). X-type experience contains a modal element, for, as Millar (1991)
says, it refers to conditions which would be true if such and such were the case; thus,
we could have a (ghost)-type experience even if the modality is empty. So an X
type experience is not X-indicating; STs whale-type experience, caused by a plastic
whale, is not whale-indicating. Further, it is possible to modify X-type experiences
by using the Principle of Phenomenal Character. Thus, two experiences may be
phenomenally different yet be the same type of experience in the sense that one is an
apple on a tree type, another is an apple on a table type. We can schematize these
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types of experience as follows: X on background t-type and X on background b-type.
Such refinements are made from the certain environmental factors. In addition, it
is also possible to modify our X-type experiences by putting in special conditions
of the subject. For example, we can speak of seeing an apple with one eye or with
eyes partially open which can be schematized as follows: a as o-type, or a as p-type.
Sometimes we talk of seeing things with the artist’s eye — it is a special condition
of the subject and, as Millar says, it affects the way a subject experiences an entity.
Similarly, having a concept of, say, X is another special condition of the subject and,
as I show here, affects the way a subject experiences that type of experience.
In the light of what I said above, let us see what it means when P says that it seems
to S that an X is there. In a typical case we would take P to imply that S has both
an X-type experience, and also has an experience of an X. To experience something
as an X is to experience something as an instance of X and not its complement6
.
Such judgment requires that the experiencer must have acquired the concept of X
and so has the ability to know an X under appropriate conditions. If S did not have
the concept of an X, he could, nonetheless, have an X-type experience but not an
experience of an X. In order to make this point clear let us consider the cases of two
children S and P; S has the concept of a whale, P does not. Suppose they both visit
the Sea World and pass a pond; there is something which is bobbing up and down
the pond and it comes within 5”s visual field. Initially both S and P have whale-type
experience. Suddenly S realizes that a whale is floating up and down the pond. This
is what happens in S”s visual field: As S' looks at this thing, certain features (e.g. the
shiny black coat of the whale) become salient for S. As STs conceptual capacity affects
his experience, his experience undergoes a phenomenal change and he recognizes the
whale as an whale which initially he did not. After this recognition P can describe
6 As I show later, this is the same as being in the belief state of there being an X in the absence
of countervailing conditions.
52
S' s exPerience by saying “its seeming to S that a whale is there”. In this case, S has
an experience which is both whale-type and of a whale.
Here I am proposing that an experience gets a definite interpretation (in this
case as an experience of a whale) only secondarily. According to the Principle of
Phenomenal Character
,
5”s and P's experiences are phenomenally different
;
they are
not, however, contrary to what Adequacy Thesis says, different types of experiences.
Phenomenal change is responsible for Ss subsequent recognition of the whale as the
whale. Hence, knowing an X as an X is not an intrinsic part of experiencing an A;
only when S recognizes an X can he experience an X as an X. I propose to call this,
following cognitive psychologists, “bottom-up information processing”
.
What I have just said shows that the theses of McGinn, Searle, and Peacocke, that
all experiences are interpreted as experiencing something, is not correct. Bottom-up
information processing is not accepted by all cognitive psychologists. For these
psychologists phenomenal change is not responsible for S' s recognizing X as an X (in
our above example); recognizing A as an A brings about the phenomenal change in
Ss experience. Knowing an A as an A, according to them, is intrinsic to experience:
there is no such thing as pre-cognitive (or we can say A-type) experience. The
processing that conforms to this view is called “top-down information processing”
in cognitive psychology.
4.2 The Bottom-up Model of Information Processing in Experiences
Top-down information processing is advocated by psychologists such as Rock
(1983) and Budd (1987). For Rock our experience is always interpretative. Ac-
cording to this view, we always perceive things, say a portrait, as something or
other. Famous examples are duck/rabbit where we see a picture first according to
one interpretation (as a duck), and then another (as a rabbit). M. Budd (1987) also
thinks that we process information in a top-down way. So, according to these psy-
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chologists, we always experience things as something or the other. Thus, according
to top-down information processing, information is cognition driven. On the other
hand, according to Fodor, in top-down processing “In the course of computing a
structural description, information that is specified only at relatively high levels of
representation should be ‘fed back’ to determine analysis at relatively lower levels.”
(p. 64). “High-level” cognitive processes involve conceptual abilities (or the ability
to judge an X to be an A), beliefs, and expectations which get “fed back” into our
inputs at a “lower level.” According to “Bottom-up processing”, on the other hand,
sensory inputs do not receive any feedback from higher-order beliefs, expectations,
or conceptual knowledge; they (inputs) are, to use a phrase from Fodor (1983),
“encapsulated” from cognitive capacities such as conceptual knowledge, beliefs, and
expectations. Thus, according to the theory of bottom-up information processing,
information is data-driven.
Philosophers and cognitive psychologists who champion the top-down information
processing are Bruner (1970) in his “New Look” account and Schank (1970) in
“Conceptual Dependency: A Theory of Natural Language Understanding” (Cog-
nitive Psychology: 3) (pp. 552- 631). Bruner doubts the existence of any “pure
stimulus process”. He (1970) thinks that when we stimulate any subject, say S', with
an appropriate input, S responds by referring the input to some class of things or
events. To use Bruner’s phrase, in all cases when S gets an input from sensory outlet
he presses a lever which, he says, he has been “tuned to press”, i.e., he categorizes
the experience under some class. Bruner says, “On the basis of certain defining or
critical attributes in the input, what are usually called cues although they should be
called clues (35), there is a selective placing of the input in one category of identity
rather than another. The category need not be elaborate : ‘a sound’ ‘a touch’, ‘a
pain’, are also examples of categorized inputs” (Bruner p. 123). Bruner also says,
What is interesting about the nature of inference from cue to identity of
perception is that it is in no sense different from other kinds of categorial
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inferences based on defining attributes. ‘That thing is round and hubbly
in texture and orange in color and of such and such size — therefore it is
an orange: let me now test its other properties to be sure.’ In terms of
process, this course of events is no different from the more abstract task
of looking at a number, determining that it is divisible only by itself and
unity, and thereupon categorizing it in the class of prime numbers. So at the
outset, it is evident that one of the principal characteristic of perceiving is
a characteristics of cognition generally In no sense need the process be
conscious or deliberate. A theory of perception, we assert, needs a mechanism
capable of inference and categorizing as much as one is needed in a theory of
cognition (p. 123-124).
Biuner compares categorization to the placement of an element from a universe
in the subset of that universe of items; such placement is made on the basis of
ordered dimensional pairs, triplets, n-tuples. The strongest argument that Bruner
puts forward for his view is the impossibility of communicating perception which is
non-categorized. He says, “If .... experience is ever had raw, i.e., free of categorical
identity it is doomed to be a gem serene, locked in silence of private experience” (p.
125). He compares perception with understanding natural language, which also has
a conceptual basis.
Like Bruner, Schank (1972) thinks that our understanding of natural language is
conceptually driven. Schank (1957) criticizes Chomsky’s transformational generative
grammar (p. 65) which is syntax based; the latter, Schank contends, does not
give any serious theory of human understanding. According to Schank, syntactical
analysis of a sentence is sufficient for programs which use natural language, although
it may not even be necessary. But, as he observes, the only function of syntax is to
be a pointer to semantic information rather than as a first step to semantic analysis.
Schank says,
.... the basis of natural language is conceptual. That is, I claim that there
exists a conceptual base that is interlingual, onto which linguistic structures
in a given language map during the understanding process and out of which
such structures are created during generation... The simple fact that it is
possible for humans to understand any given natural language if they are
immersed in it for a sufficient amount of time and to be able to translate
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from that language to whatever other natural language with which they are
well acquinted, would indicate that such conceptual base has psychological
reality. People fluent in many languages can pass freely from one to another,
sometimes even being overtly unaware of what language they are speaking at
a given instant. What they are doing is evoking a package of mapping rules
for a given language from a conceptual base. The conceptual base has in it the
content of the thought that is being expressed. The conceptual content is then
mapped into linguistic units via realization rules humans certainly do
not regularly engage in the process of understanding isolated sentences. They
understand sentences with respect to the linguistic and situational contexts
in which they are uttered and any theory of natural language understanding
must account for this too (p. 554-555).
Some experiments try to show that our information processing is essentially
top-down. These experiments take word recognition or the linguistic context as
a prototype of information processing. Take an experiment reported by Warren
in his article (1970) entitled, “Perceptual Restoration of Missing Speech Sounds”
in Science. The intention of the experiment was to see whether the replacement
of a phoneme in a recorded sentence by a cough could be perceived. There were
two separate experiments. In the first experiment twenty undergraduate psychology
students were given a sentence with one-hundred and twenty seconds missing from
the original sentence. The original sentence ran as follows: “The state governer
met with their respective legislatures concerning their capital city.” The letter ‘s’
(the first use of ‘s’) in “legislature” was replaced by a cough as follows: legi
—
cough lature. Together with a portion of adjecent phonemes which might provide
transitional cues to the missing sound. After the students used the tape, they were
presented with a version of typewritten sentence which was an exact presentation
of what they had heard and asked to circle a missing phoneme. Nineteen of them
did not see anything missing, but one saw a phoneme missing beyond the word
legislature. In a second experiment, twenty subjects were presented with a tape
of the second sentence but now the cough was replaced by a 1600hz tone (intensity
equal to the peak intensity of the cough). Here too none of the subjects could identify
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the position of the tone correctly. Eight subjects identified the missing ‘s’ beyond
the legislature and most of them placed it earlier. As Warren remarks, “Phonemic
restoration are linked to language skills, which enable the listener to replace correct
sound. The experiments involving the deletion of the first ‘s’ in ‘legislature’ did
not permit the listener familiar with English any choice (that is, no other sound
could produce and English word). But, Sherman (3) found that when a short cough
was followed immediately by the sounds corresponding to ‘ite’, so that the word
fragment could have been derived from several words, such as ‘kite’ or ‘bite’, the
listener used other words in the sentence to determine the phonetic restoration” (p.
392). Warren says, “The ability to understand speech with masked phoneme is
not surprizing: the redundancy of language can account readily for this. However,
our lack of awareness of the restorative processes — our illusory perception of the
speaker’s utterance rather than the stimulus actually reaching our ears — reflects
characteristics of speech perception which may help us understand the perceptual
mechanisms underlying verbal organization” (p. 393). What this shows is that our
belief/expectations are fed back into our sensory inputs. As Fodor remarked, what
is meant here is that information about high-level redundancies is ‘fed back’ to ‘fill
in’ the sensory input that is absent.
Another example worth considering here involves a case of scomota, which is a
retinal disease that causes a person to miss a part of his visual field. Experiments
show that subjects having scomotae supply whatever is missing in their visual field.
This experiment also supports the thesis that higher level information is “fed back”
into lower level. The experiment called the High Cloze procedures might also be
cited to show how one’s expectation affects one’s lexical context. Take two people
S and P. P utters a fragment of sentence token and S has to complete it. P says,
“I would like a simple breakfast of bread and ”. S can fill in either of the
two words (a) butter or (b) chocolate. S chooses (a) which is the high-cloze or the
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most favorable choice. In this case ‘most favorable’ means ‘one that P would most
probably choose’. This shows that P’s expectations played a role in P’s filling up the
blank.
I contend, contrary to the above, that information processing is essentially bottom-
up and that sensory inputs are at first cognitively or conceptually impenetrable.
Before presenting my view, I want to distinguish conceptual penetration (the way
in which our conceptual knowledge affects our sensory inputs) from (1) top-down
information processing within the module and (2) contextual facilitation. As Fodor
(1983) observes, the phoneme restoration as described by Warren shows only that
the subject knows about the lexical inventory of his language and it illustrates
top-down information flow in speech perception (p. 77). Here the only “background
knowledge” is the hearer’s knowledge of the words in his language; such knowledge
is a top-down flow of cognition within the language of module. This is not the
same as cognitive penetrability. The latter involves access to information that is not
specified at any of the levels of representations that the language system computes;
these involve probable beliefs and intentions of his interlocuter. Fodor remarks,
Counterexamples to encapsulation must exhibit the sensitivity of the parser to
information that is not specified internal to the language recognition module
and constraints on syntactic well-formedness are paradigms of information
that does not satisfy this condition. The issue is currently a topic of intens-
ive experimental and theoretical inquiry; but as things stand I know of no
convincing evidence that syntactic parsing is ever guided by the subject’s
appreciation of semantic content or of ‘real world’ background. Perhaps this
is not surprizing: there are, in general, so many syntactically different ways of
saying the same thing that even if context allowed you to estimate the content
of what is about to be said, that information would not much increase your
ability to predict its form (p. 78).
We have to distinguish between cognitive penetration and contextual facilitation.
An experiment described by Swinney (1979) shows that a very strong semantic
context apparently does not direct lexical access. In this particular experiment there
were sentences having lexical ambiguity. The contexts act to determine sentential
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interpretations and not any higher-order cognitive processes. These biasing contexts
usually aid in the final selection of a single relevant reading for an ambiguous
word. Usually two theories have been put forward to explain how and when such
contexts aid in the final selection of a single relevant reading for an ambiguous word.
These two theories are Prior Decision Theory (PRT) and Post Decision Theory
(PST). According to PRT, prior contextual information can act to direct lexical
access so that only a single relevant reading is ever accessed for an ambiguity; such
lexical access is in general a contextually non-restricted, non-independent process.
According to PST, prior context has its effect only after all information is accessed
for an ambiguity. Lexical access is thought to be an independent and relatively
autonomous process in which a context has its effect only following complete access
of all the information about a word.
The subjects of Swinney’s experiment were eighty-four undergraduates from Tufts
University who were to be tested as part of their course requirement. They were given
four auditory tapes containing thirty-six sets of sentences (two of which occurred
sequentially) each occurring according to the permutation and combination of the
factors of ambiguity and contextual bias. The variable in ambiguity was introduced
either by introducing an ambiguous word or an unambiguous control word. In
case of context, there were either disambiguous contexts or prior strongly predictive
disambiguous contexts. Each tape contained variations of the thirty-six pairs so that
the chosen variations were equally represented on each tape. All tapes also included
some filler sentences which are randomly intercepted in the actual test sentences.
The subject were visually presented with three words. Table 4.1 depicts the way the
presentation went 7 .
Strings of letters appeared on the screen and, on the basis of these visual images,
students were supposed to decide, as fast as they could, whether or not these are
7
I have adapted these tables Swinney [1979].
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Table 4.1 Schematized Sample of Experimental Materials
Context condition
Ambiguity condition
—
Ambiguous Unambiguous
No Context
Rumor had it that, for years, the
government building had been
plagued with problems. The
man was not surprized when
he found several bugs** in the
corner of his room.
Rumor had it that, for years, the
government building had been
plagued with problems. The
man was not surprized when he
found several insects** in the
corner of his room.
Biasing context
Rumor had it that, for years, the
government building had been
plagued with problems. The
man was not surprized when he
found several spiders, roaches,
and other bugs** in the corner
of his room.
Rumor had it that, for years, the
government building had been
plagued with problems. The
man was not surprized when he
found several spiders, roaches,
and other insects** in the corner
of his room.
V isual words ANT (contextually related)
Displayed at “**” SPY (contextually inappropriate)
SEW (unrelated)
words or non-words. Together with this visual image, the subjects listened to the
sentences on the tape, although there was no connection between the two. At the
end of the experiment the students were given a sheet of paper containing twenty-one
sentence pairs. They were asked to identify whether these sentences were identical
to the ones they had heard and whether or not there were any that were left out.
When the experiment ended the students were asked the following questions:
• Were there any ambiguities in the sentences played on the tape?
• Did any of the words that appeared on the screen relate in any way to the
sentences they had heard?
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Table 4.2 Mean Reaction Times, In Milliseconds For Conditions of The Ambiguity
x Context x Visual Word Interaction: Experiment 1
Ambiguity
condition
Context
condition
Visually presented words
Contextually
related
Contextually
inappropriate
Unrelated
Ambiguity Biasing context 890 910 960
No context 916 925 974
Unambiguous Biasing context 887 958 963
No context 914 967 972
In Table 4.2 we get the result of the experiment. By analyzing the result we
find that both readings of “bug” (insects, spy) are facilitated (as contrasted with the
case of unambiguous words) in conditions having lexical ambiguity and no biasing
context as well as those having a strongly semantic biasing context. Swinney says,
Lexical decisions for words related to both the contextually inappropriate meanings
of the ambiguity appear to be facilitated compared to decisions for unrelated words.
The effects of both of the unambiguous conditions also appear quite straightforward:
lexical decisions for the ‘related’ word appear to be facilitated, but those for the
other two words are not. Thus, by inspection, the result appears to support the
Postdecision Hypothesis; even a very strong semantic context apparently does not
direct lexical access. Statistical analysis supports this contention” (p. 651).
Fischler and Bloom (1980) conducted experiments to show that expectations do
not play a great part in all cases of information processing. Such expectations were
the minimum in some cases and were reduced further when background knowledge
was increased. One such sentence was “I will walk my dog ”. The most
likely word (or “high-cloze” word) for the blank was “tomorrow”, which few could
identify. Words like “bread” and “butter”, we can conclude, are expectation driven,
but all words are not. As Fodor says, “Some processes which eventuate in perceptual
identification are, doubtless, cognitively penetrated. But this is compatible with the
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informational encapsulation of the input systems themselves. Some traditional enthu-
siasm for context-driven perceptual models may have been prompted by confusion
on this point” (p. 76).
Experiments independently conducted also show that information processing is
not top-down. In the case of perceptual illusion in phoneme restoration, the subject
has explicit knowledge that what he is experiencing is illusory; nonetheless, he
experiences an actual object. This shows that prior knowledge does not affect
experience. Further, take the case of Muller-Lyre arrows A and B which are identical
in length. Suppose S has measured A and B and have found them to be of identical
length. 'W hen presented with A and B, however, S experiences A as longer than B.
So here prior knowledge did not play any role in S”s experience. Further, suppose
S is looking at a portrait straight and then moves his head from side to side. He
knows that the vision is shifting although he sees the picture as static. Suppose,
moreover, that I knowingly push my eyeballs to the left; then the knowledge that my
eyeballs are moving is explicit, although the image remains the same; this shows that
latter knowledge is not available to the sensory input — it is encapsulated. Fodor
says, “When you voluntarily move your eyeballs with your finger, you certainly are
possessed of the information that it’s your eye (and not the visual scene) that is
moving. This knowledge is absolutely explicit; if I ask you, you can say what’s going
on. But this explicit information, available to you for (e.g.) report, is not available
to the analyzer in charge of the perceptual integration of your retinal stimulations.
That system has access to corollary discharges from the motor center and to no other
information that you possess. Modularity with a vengence.” (sic) (p. 67).
It often happens that people hear sentences which they do not expect to hear
and recognize them. Suppose S says to P, “There is a dragon drinking from the
well in the other room” . P immediately understands the words, although he never
expected to understand them as they are unanticipated stimulus and has no tint of
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our usual "high-level” beliefs and expectations. As Fodor (1983) says, “Feedback is
effective only to the extent that, prior to the analysis of the stimulus, the perceiver
knows quite a lot about what the stimulus is going to be like. Whereas, the point
of perception is, surely, that it lets us find out how the world is even when the
world is some way that we do not expect it to be. The teleology of perceptual
capacities presupposes a considerably-less-then-omniscient-organism; they would be
no use to God. If you already know how things are, why look to see how things
are ? The perceptual analysis of unanticipated stimulus layout (in language and
elsewhere) (sic) is possible only to the extent that (a) the output of the transducers
is insensitive to the belief/expectations of the organism; and (b) the input analyzers
are adequate to compute a representation of the stimulus from the information that
the transducers supply. That is to say that the perception of novelty depends on
bottom-to-top perceptual mechanisms” (p. 68).
What I have shown here is that experiential inputs are cognitively impenetrable;
hence, we can conclude that concepts do not affect experiences from the very be-
ginning. Of course, we know that in the case of learning this impenetrability has to
be reconciled with his background knowledge and learning (cognitive penetrability).
However, as Fodor says, “To demonstrate that sort of interaction between input
analysis and background knowledge is not, in itself, tantamount to demonstrating
the cognitive penetrability of the former” (p. 74).
At this point we have to consider the relationships between encapsulated inputs
and the following two things: (1) faculty psychology, (2) reflexes. According to
traditional faculty psychology, our faculties (faculties of willing, emotion, and intel-
lect) are completely separate and marked off from each other. Gall (1758-1828) was
an advocate of faculty psychology. Gall thought that each faculty in us is vertical
and walled off from one another. Thus, judging music is completely autonomous
and different from judging a mathematical proposition. By arguing for encapsulated
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inputs my aim is not to produce autonomy in Gall’s sense; I merely want to show
that Schank’s and Bruner’s theories, that our beliefs and conceptual knowledge affect
our experience from the very start, are not correct.
Inputs are somewhat like reflexes. I know that it is impossible to see a tiger
m my llvm§ room but I see it anyway and, owing to reflex action, I run away
without thinking that perhaps it is a hoax to scare me. Here my reflex action did
not exploit information and background knowledge about whether or not it is a hoax.
In this way, reflexes are like sensory inputs: they are both encapsulated. There is,
however, as Pylyshyn says, one fundamental difference between the two: Inputs have
a functional architecture which can be addressed at a priviledged algorithmic level
of analysis. In this sense, they are computationally elaborate in contrast to reflexes
which aie computationally simple when the stimulus is directly connected to the
response. Fodor says, “The typical function of the computationally elaborated input
system is to perform encapsulation” (p. 83 ).
I conclude this section with some reflections on how memory interacts with inputs.
As I say later that there are two types of memories, long-term and short-term or
occurrent memory. On having an X-type input, S reacts quickly to connect it with
the appropriate concept in long-term memory where the conceptual knowledge of
X is stored. As the input interacts with the appropriate concept, S' s experience
undergoes a phenomenal change and S has the experience of an X or, as I said
before, S recognizes an X. If S has a (fire)-type input, the input reacts with his
concept of fire and he knows the fire as fire. He may use it to consider that he has
to escape somehow. As Fodor says, the speed of access will be slower the larger
the memory is. Everything he has heard about fire such as the beliefs that Persians
having been fire worshippers, that fire was symbolized by the Persians as a deity of
strength, etc, none of which are useful here, are accessible. Short-term memory is
insensitive to size, which is good in this case. The only thing which is useful for S
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is his ability to judge a fire as fire and his subsequent reasoning pertaining to it (I
have to get out of the building, etc).
4.2.1 Some reflections on the Adequacy Thesis
In this subsection I briefly criticize the Extreme Perceptual Thesis. According to
the latter thesis, there is nothing more in an experiential state than its representa-
tional content. This contention of the Extreme Perceptual Theorists
,
as I show here,
is wrong.
First of all, suppose there are two trees T-l and T-2 in ST visual field a hundred
or two hundred yards apart. Both trees are represented in S' s experience as being
of equal physical size; S may sense one as occupying more of his visual field than
the other. This feature is not part of the representational content of ST experience.
Second, suppose that S is in a room whose walls are covered by blue paper. They
represent in ST experience as being of the same color; yet S sees one shade as darker
than the other. This difference is not part of the representational content of Ss
experiential state.
There are also cases where the representational content changes, while some
other features of an experiential state remain the same, as, for example, when our
vision changes from monocular to binocular. Suppose S is seeing a room with some
furniture in it, viewing the room first with both eyes and then with one eye. His
first experience (monocular vision) will represent some furnitures as being in front
of others; not so in the second one (binocular vision). So there is a change in Ss
representational content as he shifts from monocular to binocular vision. In both
these cases, however, there is a sense in S that the scene has remained the same. This
sameness, according to Peacocke, is a feature of Ss experience which is not included
in its representational content. Another case involves a cube with sides ABCD and
EFGH. When the ABCD side is facing us, the experience is represented as the cube
being nearer than when the EFGH side is facing us; nonetheless, Wittgenstein (1958)
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says, we do not see any change - it is not part of our representational content of
experiencing the cube. This is also true of auditory experiences. Suppose 5 hears the
engines of two motors running. Both experiences are represented to him as being of
same magnitude; nonetheless, there is a sense in which one appears to S to be nearer
than the other. These examples show that the Extreme Perceptual Theorists is not
correct — there is more to experience than its representational or semantic content.
To summarize, experiential states, like belief states, are mental states. Unlike
belief states, however, experiential states do not necessarily possess a cognitive
element. One can have an X-type experience without experiencing it as an X. If one
has the concept of an X
,
then one’s conceptual capacity interacts with the X-type
input and one has an experience of an X. This has important bearing on the thesis
that we can trace inference-like connections between experiential and belief states. I
consider this thesis in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
Quasi-Inferences: The Objections of
Davidson and Quine
My primary aim in this chapter is to show that we can trace inference-like patterns
in certain causal transitions between experience types and belief-states. Inference,
as I argued in chapter 1, is a special kind of causal connection among belief states;
such connection is guided by proper usage of concepts involved within these states.
Similarly, as I show here, in the case of transitions from experience types to belief
states, we can trace causal connections which are guided by appropriate usage of
concepts, thus instantiating inferential patterns. I contend that the rules regulate the
process of inferential transition; hence, I am advocating here a regulative theory of
inference. Neither Quine (1975) nor Davidson (1986) agrees with the thesis that we
can trace quasi-inferential connection between our experiences and our belief states.
I discuss their views in the course of this chapter. In the concluding section I talk
of a rapproachment between philosophy and psychology in the context of concept
acquisition.
5.1 Rules as Evaluative and the Objections of Quine and Davidson
In chapter 1 I argued that belief states causally sustain other belief states. For
example, 5" s mental state of believing that something looks like an apple (B-l)
causally produces his mental state of believing an apple to be there (B-2). Thus
belief states are causally efficacious. As Marshall Swain (1978) says about belief
states that they “Can be caused and be causes of other states” . Swain also contends
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that, “The members of a set of reasons, R, upon which a belief is based are also
causally efficacious” (p. 27). Moreover, the causal transition from states B-l to
state B-2 instantiates an inference pattern because it is guided by the rule for the
concept of apple. One uses this rule properly only if one can identify an apple as an
apple (as opposed to an orange). The standard of “proper usage” for rules of this
kind is natural language usage. In the above inferential transition, the basis belief.
5-7, is the causal reason for the derived belief, B-2. In all cases of such inferential
transition among belief states other beliefs states are implicated. These beliefs assert
additional facts about the concepts. These additional beliefs, as I show in chapter 5,
constitutes the evidential reason for the derived belief state. In the above case one
additional belief is that there are no countervailing factors to there being an apple in
the environment. My thesis is: When causal transitions among belief states follow
the rules of concept-usage involved within these states, an inferential pattern among
these states is instantiated. In such transitions other beliefs are also implicated.
Rules of concept-usage, as I conceive of them, involve general descriptions 1 of
the situation under which a particular concept may or may not be used. Thus,
we can say, rules are norms according to which we are permitted
,
under appropriate
situations, to use a certain concept. Causal transitions among belief states instantiate
inference patterns when rules permit such transition. Thus, rules put constraints on
causal transitions among belief states. We can evaluate a causal transition among
belief states to see whether or not it has instantiated an inferential pattern by judging
if the transition has followed the appropriate rules. In all cases of inference the
derived state is well-grounded on the basis state which sustains it.
The question is, “How do these rules function?” One can reply that the rules
prohibit processes that are inappropriate for inferential transitions; one such process
is wishful thinking. Thus, we can formulate the following rule: transition processes
'It should be noted that there are more to rules than just being descriptions.
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which are produced by wishful thinking are not inferential processes (R
x ). Suppose
S’ wishes to eat an apple (Waa ) and this wish produces his belief state that an
apple is on the table (Baa ). The latter belief state in S is a result of a process of
wishful thinking. The above transition from Wsa to B sa cannot be considered as
an inferential process as it violates R
x
. R x evaluates the process of transition and is
similar to Goldman’s (1986) reliability theory. According to the latter theory, rules
merely evaluate the process of transition. I contend, however, that these rules put
some constraints on the sort of basis state that appropriately causes a derived state;
by doing so, the rules regulate particular inferential transitions. Thus the function of
rules, as I see it, is regulative they regulate the causal process which instantiate
inferential transitions. Thus a derived belief state is well-grounded if, and only if, it
is caused by an appropriate belief state.
Certain misunderstandings about the regulative function of rules have to be
clarified. Goldman (1986) says that rules regulate inferential transitions when the
subject consciously adopts and follows them. He says, “A regulative system of norms
formulates rules to be consciously adopted and followed A nonregulative
system of evaluation, by contrast, formulates rules for appraising a performance or
trait, or assigning a normative status, but without providing instructions for the
agent to follow, or apply. They are only principles for an appraiser to utilize in
judging” (p. 25). This is not my view. As I pointed out in chapter 2, these rules are
not explicitly written propositions that we can consciously adopt and follow; they
are internalized commands which we apply under appropriate conditions. They put
constraints on the transition process between the basis and derived belief states and
hence regulate the transition process; nonetheless, even without these constraints,
these belief states, as physical states, would follow one another causally but would
not instantiate an inferential pattern. It is also possible, as I show later, to trace a
quasi-inferential pattern between &s X-type experience and his state of believing an
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X to be there; such quasi-inferential patterns are regulated by the rule of X-usage.
In such quasi-inferential patterns other beliefs are implicated.
Not all philosophers agree with the view that we can trace inferential patterns
between one’s X-type experience and one’s belief state regarding X. Davidson (1986)
identifies, what we call, an S'N X-type experience with &s believing that he has an
X-type (p. 310) 2 . According to Davidson, in all such cases the inferential transition
is between STs believing there is a red-type experience to his believing that there is
something red. It is a transition from one belief state to another and not a transition
from an experience type to a belief state. Davidson (1986) says that S, for example,
has a (green flashing)-type experience and the latter causally sustains his believing,
m the absence of countervailing conditions, a green flashing light to be there. It
is likely that if S has a green flashing type experience then there is a green light
flashing. P can say of S that he has inferred one from the other; S himself cannot
say it unless he believes that he has green flashing type experience. In other words,
S cannot derive his belief that a green flashing type experience is there from a
green flashing type experience. So one can conclude, following Davidson, that the
relation between experience-types and belief states is merely causal; there can be no
inferential connection between them. Hence a belief-state cannot be well-grounded
on the appropriate experience type.
People who adhere to Quine’s theory of language acquisition would also say
that the transition from, say, an X-type experience to believing an X to be there
instantiates only a causal law and not an inferential pattern. According to Quinians,
experiential statements (or to use a Quinian vocabulary ‘observation sentences’) are
occasion statements whose truth value depends on the circumstances of the speaker’s
utterance. Quine says that the truth of the observation sentence “it is raining”,
uttered by S
,
depends on the circumstances of the utterance. For example, “it is
2 Davidson talks about a belief; I have substituted ‘belief state’ for beliefs.
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raining”
,
uttered by 5, is a true sentence only if it is really raining; it is false if it is
not raining.
Quine (1973) says,
An observation sentence, then, is an occasion sentence whose occasion is
intersubjectively observable. But this is still not enough. After all the
sentence ‘There goes John’s old tutor’ meets these requirement; it is an
ocassion sentence, and all present witnesses can see the old tutor plodding by.
But the sentence fails of a third requirement: the witnesses must in general
be able to appreciate that the observation which they are sharing is one that
verifies the sentence. They must have been in a position, equally with the
speaker, to have assented to the sentence on their own in the circumstances.
They are in that position in the case of ‘This is red’ and ‘It is raining’ and
There goes an old man’, but not in the case of ‘There goes John’s old tutor’.
Such, then, is an observation sentence: it is an occasion sentence whose
ocassion is not only intersubjectively observable but is generally adequate,
moreover, to elicit assent to the sentence from any present witness conservant
with the language. It is not a report of private sense data; typically, rather,
it contains references to physical objects, (p. 88.)
Thus, for Quine an observation sentence results from a verbal dispositions to
assent or dissent under suitable stimulus. As Quine says, knowledge of the truth
condition of the sentence “This is red” is a disposition; it is a disposition to behave
linguistically in a certain way. Quine (1973) says, “In what behavioral disposition
then does a man’s knowledge of the truth condition of the sentence ‘This is red’
consist? Not, certainly, in a disposition to affirm the sentence on every occasion of
observing a red object, and to deny it on all other occasions; it is the disposition to
assent or dissent when asked in the presence or absence of red. Query and assent,
or query and dissent — here is the solvent that reduces understanding to verbal
dispositions (p. 88).
Thus, Quine would say that 5”s experience which one can describe as “its seeming
to S to be an A” is 5°s verbal disposition to behave in a certain way. Such an
experience is P’s verbal disposition to assent to P’s query, for example, about X
only if there is an X. Experiencing an X is not a conscious occurence; it is a stimulus
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at 5*s nerve ending. Between sensory inputs and our belief states, which are conscious
occurrences, there is only complex causal relation and no inferential connections. An
individual S cannot assert that his experiencing an X is the appropriate experience
type from which his believing an X to be there can be inferred. In other words, in
this case S cannot assert that his belief state that an X is there is well-grounded.
To show that there is inferential connection between, say, Ss experience types
and 5° s belief states we must be able to do the following two things: (1) evaluate
such connection with the help of some rules and (2) show that the belief state is
well-grounded on the experience type which caused it. To show (1) and (2) we need to
show that the belief state in question has been caused by an appropriate experiential
state. The class of belief states with which we are concerned here are empirical. Let
us consider a few examples to show that in evaluating a causal transition between
an experiential state and a belief state we take into account the appropriateness of
the experiential state. Suppose S is passing a highway (which is quite familiar to S
as he has passed it many times) in his car on a foggy day and his friend is sitting
beside him. Looking at the distance, S has an exit-100-type experience and is in the
experiential state he might express by the words “its seeming to me that exit- 100
is there.” The above experiential state causes S' s belief state that exit 100 is there.
Now, in order to show that there is an inferential connection between Ss A-tvpe
experience and his believing exit 100 to be there we need to be able to evaluate this
transition in the light of the rule of the relevant concept (the concept of exit 100).
In other words, we should be able to show that the experience type is appropriate
and that the belief-state is well grounded on it.
One can evaluate the above transition and consider it unsuitable to be called
a good inference; one can do so by showing that Ss perceptual mechanism is
not reliable over a long distance. The argument here is that the causal processes
(instantiating an inference pattern) which produce a belief state have done so by
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unreliable means. This kind of evaluation of the causal process, however, as Millar
observes, cannot account for the subsequent evaluation that S can make of this causal
transition (p. 109). Suppose that on passing exit-100 S’s attention is distracted by
some important international news on in his car radio. After having passed the exit,
S”s friend asks him if he had passed exit 100. 5 now begins to wonder whether it was
really exit-100 that he had passed. The source of his doubt here can be twofold: (1)
By considering the fog and the distance involved he might doubt that he had seen
the exit, or (2) by recollecting the visual experience he had when he was looking at
the exit he might doubt that he really perceived exit 100. It is possible to conceive
that by replaying his previous experience he came to realize that he did not clearly
see the exit number. What exactly does he replay? In order to answer this question,
some relevant and important point about replay theory has to be introduced.
It should be noted that the kind of replay theory that I am talking about here is
not the same as the Cartesian theory of copying or imagining. According to the latter
theory, a visual image consists of a likening or copy of what one sees in perception.
The problem with the copy theory is that it does not make sense to talk of the
copy of, say, an acid smell. As Gilbert Ryle (1984) observes, we can make a visual
copy of a table by reducing the three dimensional table to a two dimensional table;
it is, however, not possible to reduce a smell or a taste or a tickle to a different
dimension in imagination. According to the replay theory I am proposing, one does
not reproduce a copy of the original but may simply reactivate an experience. As
Lycan (1986) says, there will be times when one really mistakes the reactivation
for the real thing by confusing the causal sequences. For example, according to a
“Cartesian”
,
the smell of burning that he recalls is the image or copy of the actual
fire burning; according to the replay theory I am proposing, there is reactivation of
the actual smell I had earlier, and not a copy of it. Lycan says,
This theory holds that neither imagination nor memory is involved in produ-
cing internal copies of reality but is involved in producing a reactivation or
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replay of sorts of something that occurred in ordinary perception. There will
e times when one will mistake the reactivation in imagination or perceptual
memory for the real thing; that is, one will confuse the causal sequence
believing that, say, a smell of burning in one’s imagination or dream is caused
by a real fire in the house. According to a replay or reactivation theory my
smelling a slipper burning by the fire in imagination involves a replay or
part of replay of the experience of smelling a real burning slipper in front
ol a real fire with one’s own nose except the causal sequence is different
there is in fact no burning slipper and no fire, and one probablv does not
need to use one’s nose. Whatever are the brain processes that are the end
product of receiving the signals through the olfactory nerve endings of the
nasal cavities from a burning slipper are the basis of the experience of smelling
a burning slipper, in imagination or perceptual memory they are reactivated
by some purely internal causal sequence. The original experience left some
trace or residue, which are stored in some form and is now reactivated to
produce a replay. The replay is not a copy of the original experience; it is
having the original experience again, at least in its essentials or else in a form
edited to suit one’s present purposes. A copy is often just a simulacrum in
diffeient mateiials and in dimensions different from the original. A replay
or reactivation, on the other hand, is the regeneration of what went before,
albeit in edited or interpreted form at times (perhaps most times). One does
not visually imagine or recall in two dimensions what one might have seen or
has seen in three dimensions in perceptions. One imagines in just the same
term as one sees” (p. 116).
Lycan describes the following experiment from Perky (1910) to show the intimate
relation between imagining the image of the real thing and the real thing itself. In
Perky s experiment a group of subjects would sit facing a wall made of ground glass
and would be asked to imagine tomatoes, oranges, and apples on the ground glass.
Then, unknown to them, apples, oranges, and tomatoes would be projected on the
ground glass. The subject’s were asked the shape, color, size, of each of these things.
They described those of the ones projected. Lycan concludes, “Perky’s subjects
clearly mistook real images for the “images” of imagination, and so equally clearly
there are grounds for believing that there is an intimate relation between the two”
(p. 118). Further, Roger N. Shepard (1966) in “Learning and Recall as Organization
and Search” describes the case of subjects who are asked to describe the rooms in his
house. The above subject goes from one room to another and thus makes a mental
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tour of the house as if he is visiting the real house. Shepard and Metzler (1971)
describe what they call the “mental rotation” of objects to show that what we recall
is not a copy. A subject is asked to imagine a same object from different sides and
angles they did this by mental rotation of the same subject. Take the following chart
given by Alfred Binet (1969).
abed
e f g h
i j k 1
m n o p
Suppose S is asked to memorize the chart and then he is asked to recall it. He
recalls the table the way he learned it; he cannot do it differently even if he is asked
to do so. Thus, if the subject is asked, for example, to recall the table from right
to left instead of from left to right, he cannot do so without making a lot of errors.
Lycan concludes from this, “In visual memory or imagination, one does not form
anything like a static picture; rather one reherses, reactivates, or replays the moves
one made with one’s eyes (and head and perhaps whole body at times) when one
first saw and tried to record the letter square. Visual memory and imagination are
the replay of perception. We can do in visual memory and imagination only what
we have done (at least in some partial way) (sic) in perception” (p. 119).
These experiments show that we can recall objects themselves and not their
images. Let us now apply this replay theory to the above example of experiencing
exit 100. When S replays his previous experience of passing exit 100, he did not
reproduce a copy; he reproduced the original experience type (exit 100 type). Now he
doubts that it was an appropriate experience type to produce an inferential transition
to his believing that there is exit 100; hence, the belief state cannot be well-grounded.
It should be noted that here S does not take into account the appropriateness of a
former belief-state regarding exit 100; he takes into account the appropriateness of
the former experience type as causing a belief state. Further, it is not an experiential
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state with a content such as it seeming to be exit-100. For if it was the latter type
of experience then S would not have considered it inappropriate for producing the
corresponding belief state. What he considers here is the conception he has of an
experience of a certain phenomenal type — the type which exit-100 on a clear day
yields 3
. What this shows is that experiences of phenomenal types are taken into
account when evaluating whether or not a particular transition has instantiated an
inferential process. 5”s believing exit 100 to be there may be derived from his exit-100
type experience given the circumstances that there are countervailing beliefs.
In chapter 2 I said that, according to the operational theory, having a concept is an
ability, it is an ability to identify an instance of a concept in an appropriate situation
and distinguish it from its complement. Thus, S has learned the concept of an X if,
and only if, S identifies a thing as an X and not a not-X. For S, who has learned the
concept of an X
,
two condition needs to be fulfilled in order to have an experience of
an X. The condition is as follows: (1) S must have an X-type experience and (2) he
must be in the mental state which one can describe as “its seeming to S that an X is
there.” Experiences may take on the content that an X is there through the exercise
of the conceptual capacities in which the mastery of the relevant concept consists.
S may not have the experience of an X either because S does not have the concept
of an X or because the content and the type of experience do not mesh together. In
the case of the exit example the content of <S”s experience and its phenomenal type
did not match. In other words, the experience-type is misapplied. S applied the
concept of an exit to the present scene and he did this in response to the experience
of the wrong type. In other words, STs mastery of the concept of an exit was engaged
with an experience which was not an X-type experience. As Millar says, “Given
the fallibility of our capacities these different ways in which phenomenal type and
content can fail to mesh should come as no surprise” (p. 110).
3 This is Millar’s (1991) notion.
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In order to clarify my point, I consider next another example from Millar. This
case concerns nectarines and apples which look almost alike; we can, however,
visually distinguished them if we look carefully. Thus, 5 can have an apple-type
experience as distinguished from a nectarine-type experience. It is, however, possible
to mistake a nectarine for an apple. Let us consider two different sources of such an
error. First, one can look at a nectarine and have an apple type experience because of
some perceptual defect. This, as Millar says, is a defect in S?s perceptual mechanism
and not a problem with his belief state. Second, suppose S passes a stall where some
nectarines are kept and he glances at them and has a nectarine type experience.
Later his friend asks him if there were red apples in the stall. As S’ was distracted as
he was talking to his friend, he did not attend in thought to what he was seeing. So
he replayed his nectarine-type experience (which is the correct type of experience)
but applied the concept of apple and concluded that there were apples in the store.
Millar says, “Whereas in this case you do see properly what you are looking at, in
the first case you do not. In both cases, you are too quick to believe that apples
are there. The experience is such that it seems that red apples are before you and,
there being no countervailing factors, so far as you know, that is what you believe.
But the experience is not of the type which is apt for the proper engagement of the
relevant conceptual capacities” (p. 111).
From what we have said above it is clear that a belief state can be evaluated
as “well-grounded” or not depending on whether or not it was produced by the
appropriate experience-type. When a belief state is produced by the appropriate
experience type an inferential pattern between them is instantiated4 .
4 Here I am concerned with concepts of observables only; I am not considering concepts of
unobservables such as the concept of an X-ray.
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5.2 Quasi Inference, Concepts, and Justification
In the last section I showed that we can evaluate a transition from an experience-
type to a belief state as instantiating inference pattern. If the transition process
instantiates an inference pattern then, as I said earlier, the experience type is appro-
priate and the belief state is well-grounded on it. Let us see if we can actually trace
any inference-like patterns between experience types and belief states. Suppose S
has a red apple type experience then, if S has mastered the concept of a red apple,
S will be in the experiential state which one can describe as, “its seeming to S that
a red apple is there”
. This is, Millar says, equivalent to &s believing that a red
apple is there given S also believes that there are no countervailing factors. In the
above example, beliefs regarding the absence of countervailing conditions assert that
the following are not true: that this is not the time for apples to grow, this is not
a good place for apples, that there are some plastic apples lying around, etc. These
additional beliefs are implicated in the transition from the experience-type to the
belief state that an apple is there.
Certain important features about beliefs regarding countervailing conditions have
to be addressed here. These beliefs, I contend, are part of one’s mastery of the
appropriate concept. In the case of the concept of apples, for example, it is part of
my mastery of the latter concept that apples are found only in certain parts of the
world at certain times. It should be noted that these beliefs are not part of one’s
primary acquisition of the concept of apples. When, as a child, S learned the primary
meaning of “apple” he learned to identify an apple as an apple. The more familiar
one is with a concept, in this case the concept of apples, the more one knows about
the additional and the countervailing factors regarding the concept.
To summarize what I have said above, S (the subject), who has the concept
X
,
on having an X-type experience reaches a conscious occurrence which one can
describe as “its seeming to S that an X is there.” This causes in him the mental
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state of believing that an X is there in the absence of countervailing conditions.
There is, as Millar contends, a difference between having a positive belief that
there are no countervailing conditions and having an implicit belief that there are
no countervailing conditions, ^s experiential state which one can describe as “its
seeming to S that an apple is there” may cause &s belief state of an apple being there
although he did not consider positively any countervailing conditions. If so, then the
question is, “Are countervailing conditions insignificant for quasi-inferences?” No.
It is true that in some cases we do not positively take countervailing conditions into
consideration; nonetheless, they are implicit in our quasi-inference. This is evident
from the fact that if someone asked S (when his state of believing an apple to there
is caused by his apple type experience) if he believes that there are countervailing
conditions to there being apples, S would reply “no”. This shows that he implicitly
takes such beliefs into account in considering the quasi inference although he never
explicitly considers them. As Lycan (1971) says, in order to be in a belief state of
there being an X, S must have have the proper input experience and also believe
that there are no countervailing conditions to there being an X. Hence, we can trace
a transition between 5”s X-type experience and his belief state that an X is there:
• S has an Apple-type visual experience.
• S is in the experiential state in which it seems to him that an apple is there.
In the latter state S believes that the place is conducive for apples to be present
(there are no countervailing conditions to apples existing in the environment.)
• S is in the belief state that an apple is there.
The above transition instantiates a quasi-inference as S’s mental state passes
from an experience type to a belief state. Such inference is guided by the usage of
the concept of apple in natural language. The experience type is an appropriate one
and the belief state is well-grounded on it.
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5.2.1 Concepts as Dynamic entities: Psychology and Epistemological
Queries
In chapter 2 I showed that having a concept is an ability to apply properly rules of
concept usage under appropriate conditions. Thus 5 has the concept of A" if, and only
if, S knows an X as an X when he has an X-type input. I call this the justification
theory of concept acquisition 5
. Here a subject, 5, is justified in identifying an X when
he has an X-type input. Thus when 5 has an apple-type input (the condition of there
being an apple obtains), his input interacts with the rule of apple usage stored in his
memory and he has an experience of an X. This is possible because S has acquired
the rule of X usage in natural language. As I said before, rules of concept usage
are not propositional; they are similar to the rules of driving and swimming. Like
the latter, these rules of concept usage are internalized commands which we apply
as the situation arises. As I show in chapter 5, rules may be first learned in the
form of propositions that are stored in our long term memory; gradually these rules
are internalized and we apply them without consciously thinking of them. I call this
the primary concept acquisition. Concepts are, however, not a static but dynamic
entities. Gradually S acquires more knowledge (propositional) regarding apples i,e,
that apples grow at a particular time and in a particular part of the world. These
propositions gradually become part of his rule of concept acquisition of apples and
are no longer mere propositional knowledge. As S internalizes these propositions,
they become part of his concept of apples.
When a person’s concepts are enriched by propositional knowledge, I say that he
has undergone a process of secondary concept acquisition. Why do I call the original
acquisition primary? Because we can justify an original concept usage as correct or
incorrect in the light of the standard use of the speakers of the same language. Thus
the primary learning has more objectivity than the secondary. It may at one time
5 This is a term I borrowed from Pollock [1986].
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be part of STs rule of apple usage that they grow only in a certain season; this rule,
however, may not be part of P’s concept usage. Such secondary knowledge about
a concept are first acquired as propositions and gradually they become part of the
rule of apple usage in one’s vocabulary and one applies them as the situation arises.
There are innumerable rules of concept usage that can be evoked when a proper
situation arises. In case I have a fire type input my fire experience interacts with
the natural language rules of fire usage, which are stored in my short term memory,
and the result sustains my belief state that there is fire. As I said before, there can
be many facts about fire that is stored in memory such as Persians having been fire
worshippers. Now, the question is, how much of this is accessed by memory? Only
the knowledge that interacts with my fire type input which is necessary for me to
escape is accessed. Our countervailing beliefs are all part of our secondary notion of
concept acquisition and hence develop as we become more and more familiar with a
concept.
In concluding this chapter, I would like to discuss certain important aspects
of concept acquisition. I have the concept of an apple if, and only if, I would be
justified in recognizing or identifying an apple, i.e., in properly applying the rule
of apple usage. The standard or norm of proper usage is, as I said earlier, their
usage in ordinary natural language for the purpose of communication. It should be
noted at this point that the whole notion of concept acquisition that we have been
talking so far must be realistic from a psychological point of view. In other words,
the whole notion of concept acquisition must be verifiable psychologically. Quine
(1975) contends that epistemology is a chapter in psychology. Contrary to Quine, I
believe that epistemology is a normative discipline concerned with the justification of
our knowledge (beliefs, experiences). Psychology, on the other hand, is the natural
science about human mind; hence, the two are distinct. My whole notion of concept
learning and belief formation rests on a rapproachment between these two disciplines.
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Thus, I contend that no true epistemological theory is successful without resting on
solid findings of psychology.
CHAPTER 6
Why We Import Beliefs Into Our
Ontology and How we can Justify
Them
My primary aim in this chapter is to discuss why we need to introduce proposi-
tions (beliefs) into our ontology. Propositions (beliefs), as I show here, are evidential
reasons
1 for the conclusion of a quasi-inference. Further, in this chapter I consider
the nature and justification of these propositions (beliefs).
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In section 1 I show how objects
are represented and integrated into our cognitive framework. Also, I give reasons for
introducing propositions into my ontology. In section 2 I consider various theories for
justifying the general propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences from experience
types to belief states. Here I critically survey the following three theories: Founda-
tionalism (with special reference to Chisholm), The Coherence Theory (concentrating
on the theories of K. Lehrer and L. BonJour), and Millar’s theory of ‘normative
propositions.’
6.1 Language of Thought and Propositions
The following is a quasi-inference from STs apple-type experience to his believing
an apple to be there:
Tn the course of this chapter I distinguish between causal and evidential reason.
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• S has an Apple-type visual experience.
• S ^ ^ the experiential state in which it seems to him that an apple is there.
In the latter state S believes that the place is conducive for apples to be present (there
are no countervailing conditions to apples existing in the environment.)
• S is in the state of believing an apple to be there.
The above transition proceeds from an apple-type experience to a state of be-
lieving an apple to be there, and it instantiates a quasi-inferential pattern; thus, we
can evaluate STs belief state
(S believing an apple to be there) in the light of his
experience type (apple-type experience). If our evaluation is positive then we can
say that S s belief state (an apple being there) is well grounded on the appropriate
experience type.
I have said in chapter 1 that our state of believing something is a complex
mental state. A mental state (such as a belief state) cannot be expressed in a
proposition; it can only be expressed in a language of thought. Thought in general,
I contend, proceeds by a language of thought which is non-propositional and which
represents objects non-propositionally in contrast to propositional representations.
Two different theories have been put forward regarding representation of objects;
they are as follows: (1) de dicto representation theory and (2) de re representation
theory2 . An object is represented de dicto when it is represented under a description,
or when it is represented propositionally. Thus, some terms may be thought to
represent an object, o, because they are associated with some description, J9, that
represents an object, o. But a description ultimately consists of terms, and if
those terms could represent objects only because they are associated with further
descriptions that apply to the appropriate object, we would be faced with an infinite
regress of terms, each owing their reference to some preceding term or terms. For
2
I have borrowed the terms de dicto and de re representation from Pollock (1986).
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instance, S may represent the object whale under the description “the mammal who
lives in the sea”. Now this description of a whale is further associated with the
description that applies to the objects, mammals, and sea. Objects like mammals
and sea may be represented in the individual S by means of other descriptions
involving other objects which in turn would be associated with other descriptions,
and so on. Given that such a regress is unacceptable, we should conclude that some
terms must represent their objects directly : their representational function cannot
depend on the representational function of some other terms. De re representation
theory, I contend, can avoid the problem of infinite regress. According to de re rep-
resentation theory, singular objects such as whales are represented in an individual
S non-propositionally. To ‘know’ (non-propositionally) a singular object is to grasp
the conceptual role of the concept or term denoting that object in natural language.
Grasping the conceptual role of a concept, as I said in chapter 2, is knowing how
to use the concept. The correct usage of a concept is judged according to whether
such usage is permitted in natural language and ordinary communication. Thus,
a subject, S, has a concept of, say, apple if, and only if, he can use the concept
properly, i.e., identify an apple (not an orange) as an apple; thus his usage of the
concept of apple is permissible in ordinary language.
To understand the workings of our language of thought with its de re represent-
ation of objects, let us consider the functions of an artificially intelligent machine3
,
S2
,
designed and created by 5, a scientist. S2
,
by using his sensors, can sense and
react to the external world. If S2 has an X-type input (such as a burning type
sensation) he can react to it. This is version one of S2. The problem with S2 at this
stage, however, is that he does not know that he has a certain type of experience. To
have the latter kind of knowledge, S2 must have another sensor which senses that he
3
1 have adapted the concept of an intelligent machine from Pollock. He talks of an intelligent
machine called Oscar (1986).
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has X-type inputs; we can call these sensors “second order sensors”
. Accordingly, S
constructs a second version of S2, S2a , with second order sensors. S2a is capable of
knowing an X as an X when he has X-type inputs. S2a is more sophisticated than
S2: [t can identify an apple when it has an apple-type input. Nonetheless, S2 has
some shortcomings: it does not have the sophistication to distinguish between, say,
a plastic apple and a real apple4
. S2a can identify an apple as an apple; he cannot,
however, know (it is not part of his concept of apple) where they grow and what
part of the year they are produced; hence, he sometimes mistakes a fake apple for a
real one. Concepts, as I said earlier, are dynamic and not static entities. Learning
a concept partially involves knowing the secondary factors which include, among
other things, certain additional and countervailing beliefs. S2a does not have these
additional beliefs (that such a place is or is not conducive to there being apples) and
therefore he identifies a plastic apple as a real apple. S now constructs S2ai with these
additional beliefs and also with beliefs regarding the absence of countervailing factors
as part of his concept of apples. S2 ai ’s concept of an apple is more sophisticated
than that of S2a and there is a less chance of S2ai identifying a fake apple as an
apple.
Our language of thought, like the language of thought belonging to S2ai , works
by manipulating singular terms in conformity with the rules of appropriate concept
usage; these rules and our dispositions to conform to them constitute the conceptual
roles of terms in our language of thought5 . Proper usage of concepts means, as I
pointed out earlier, proper application of the rules of concept-usage. A rule is used
4 This is similar to the example I cited in chapter 2 where a child identifies a plastic whale as
a real one. I pointed out that in the process of learning about the concept of whale there are
various dimensions that the child has yet to grasp; hence, at this stage it is possible for him to
make mistakes.
5
It should be noted at this point that human thought or consciousness is much more complicated
than that of S2s . Human consciousness, as I showed in chapter three following Edelman (1992), is
primarily recognition and adaptive capability. The analogy with S2a should not be taken too far.
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properly if, and only if, it has fulfilled its proper role: meaningful communication in
ordinary language. S, for example, uses a term t according to a proper rule, r, if.
and only if, he uses t according to standard t-usage in natural language. So r usage
is correct or incorrect in relation to a certain standard — ordinary language and
communication; hence, rules are goal-oriented. Rules are integrated into our general
cognitive framework by means of de re representation of objects. So we think of
most singular objects in non-descriptive ways. Sometimes we learn many concepts
under a description. Eventually, however, we forget the description; we merely retain
and internalize the rules for their usage. Inputs of experience types interact with the
appropriate rule, stored in our memory6
,
and we reach the mental state of believing
that an entity is there. Pollock says,
I might have first come to think of Christopher Columbus under the descrip-
tion like The man my teacher is talking about 1
,
but I can no longer remember
just what description I might have used and I may no longer remember
that Christopher Columbus satisfies that description. Such forgetfulness does
not deprive me of my ability to think of Christopher Columbus. I have a
nondescriptive way of thinking of Christopher Columbus. Such nondescriptive
way of thinking of objects are parasitic on originally having of some other
way of thinking of objects (either perceptual or descriptive), but they are
distinct from these other ways. I call these nondescriptive way of thinking
of objects u de re representation” From an information processing point
of view we can think of de re representations as pigeon holes into which we
stuff properties as we acquire reasons to believe that the objects represented
having those properties. Properties may drop out of pigeon holes if they are
not used occasionally (i.e., we forget). In order to establish a pigeon hole as
representing a particular object we must begin by thinking of the object in
some other way, and that initial way of thinking of objects will be the first
thing to be put into the pigeon hole. For example, we must begin by thinking
of the object under a description, from that we acquire de re representation
of the object, and then we might forget the original description and only be
able to think of the object under the de re representation (p. 157.)
Mental representation which is constituted by singular terms is non-propositional.
Why, then, are propositions introduced into our ontology? Propositions, I contend,
6
It should be noted here, as I pointed out in chapter 1, that memory, according to the theory I
am following is not a data bit storage phenomenon but a biological one.
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are entities to which truth and falsity can be assigned 7
. Propositions, I show here,
are introduced into our ontology in order to assign truth and falsity to our thoughts
by assigning content to them. There are two ways of thinking a thought: thinking by
means of that thought and thinking about that thought. When we think by means
of a thought we may think about whatever the thought is about; usually, this is
something in the world a pig or a fence, say. Sometimes, however, our thought
is about another thought; such a thought is a second-order representation because
it is about something that is about something else. When I wish to ascribe truth or
falsity to a thought, I must think about it in a special way: I must think of it in
terms of its “content”
. As Pollock observes,
We can think of a proposition in different ways. For example, I might
think of a proposition under the contingent description ‘the first proposition
entertained by Bertrand Russell on the morning of April 3, 1921.’ But I
will not ordinarily be able to ascribe truth or falsity to the proposition so
conceived unless I know what proposition it is. To know what proposition it
is is to be able to think of it in another way, “in terms of its content”
,
and
know that the two propositions are the same (p. 166).
We have to accept propositions because we engage in default reasoning which
sometimes requires us to reevaluate our reason for thinking something. It has been
assumed until recently that there are only two kinds of reasonings, deductive and
inductive. In valid deductive reasoning we proceed from a given truth (or premises)
to a truth (conclusion) and the premise entails the conclusion. In other words,
in valid deductive reasoning if the premises are true the conclusion must be true.
Given that all mammals are carnivorous and all carnivorous animals live long, we
can conclude that all mammals have long life. The claim here is not that the premises
are true but that if they are true then the conclusion cannot be false. In contrast
7
It may be objected by someone that propositions are ontologically unacceptable. In the course
of this dissertation I do not want to enter into the discussion whether there are propositions because
that is a topic for a different paper; I simply assume that there are propositions and that they are
entities to which the properties of truth and falsity can be properly assigned.
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to this, in inductive reasoning we draw a conclusion from the premises but the
premises do not entail the conclusion. In other words, in inductive reasoning it
is not necessary that the conclusions are true if the premises are true. Thus on
observing about 100 swans and finding that they are all black, I inductively conclude
that all swans are black. Here the premise confirms the conclusion to a certain degree
but does not guarantee its truth. In recent years workers in Artificial Intelligence8
have discovered that reasoning proceeds neither by deduction nor by induction but
by default or non-monotonic reasoning. According to default or defeasible reasoning,
a set of propositions is provided as an evidence for certain things till the evidence is
refuted and a different evidence comes into its place. Pollock says,
According to default reasoning, S
,
the subject, must be able to recognize that
one of his thoughts is the reason for another. Thinking of thoughts in this way,
S must be able to assign truth/falsity to thoughts. In other words, S must
be able to think in terms of propositions. But I will not ordinarily be able
to ascribe truth or falsity to the proposition so conceived unless I know what
proposition it is. To know what proposition it is, is to be able to think of it
in another way, “in terms of its content”
,
and know that the two propositions
are the same. This is to think of the proposition in a “direct” fashion that is
necessarily a way of thinking of that particular proposition In correct
defeasible reasoning we must also think about our thoughts, judging, for
instance, that something we used in getting to a particular conclusion was
false. We do not need the concept of truth in order to affirm a thought while
we are thinking that thought. The affirmation is part of the thinking. But in
order to affirm a thought while thinking about it, we do need the concept of
truth. The ability to ascend a level and think about our thoughts is required
for the operation of defeasible reasoning, and that in turn requires that we
have the evaluative concepts of truth and falsity (p. 165.)
Take the following case of default reasoning: S predicts, on the basis of his obser-
vation of nimbus clouds (evidence), that it will rain, Sis prediction is based on the
general hypothesis that nimbus clouds cause rain ( h). According to default reasoning,
S believes in h because there is nothing contrary to h that he knows of: he believes
in h by default. Such generalization may be later refuted by further information that
8Some of these people are McDermott (1980), Doyle (1979), Reiter (1978).
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cirrus — not nimbus— clouds cause rain. After this new information S believes
that the correlation between nimbus clouds and raining is false; so hypothesis h, for
5, has been refuted (or superseded by) hypothesis h-1 which states that cirrus clouds
cause rain. Later h-1 may be refuted or falsified by further information.
Thus what we see here is that when we obtain new information, we often have
to consider its relation to thoughts (or beliefs) we have previously held, and this
requires us to think of certain thoughts (old and new) in relation to their content
and truth values. Thus, I can think after dinner today that I need to write my
proposal; the sentence following ‘that’ is the content of my thought, hence this is
thinking in terms of content. We can, it is true, sometimes identify our thoughts by
contingent properties that do not require us to assign contents to them: we do this
when we think of a thought as, say, the first one we had after dinner. But this way
of identifying a thought is not satisfactory for defeasible reasoning where we need
to evaluate our reason for thinking something: in such a case we need to identify
a thought (or belief) by reference to the content. Since, as I indicated above, the
content of the thought is the proposition it involves, we have to introduce propositions
into our ontology. We can apply ‘falsity’ to propositions that is needed in defeasible
reasoning. Pollock observes,
The way in which we ascend levels and ascribe truth values to propositions is
dictated by our epistemic norms. If P is a proposition I am able to entertain,
then my language of thought must contain a mental representation ‘P’ of P,
and my epistemic norms must license something like the following:
What I believed was ‘P’
P
Therefore, what I believed was true.
Just to have a label, I call this disquotational reasoning. I write the mental
representation ‘P’ using quotation marks because this is suggestive of the way
the representation works. The quotation marks cannot be taken altogether
seriously because we are not forming the quotation name of a sentence but
rather a mental representation of a proposition. But there is a strong and
important parallel between the mental representation ‘P’ and quotation names
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of sentences. We can refer to a sentence in terms of some property it has
contingently, e.g. as the first sentence on page 137.’ In contrast to this,
quotation names are noncontingent ways of referring to sentences. The rules
of English language dictate that enclosing a sentence in quotation marks
generates a term designating that sentence and no other sentence
(p. 165).
Default reasoning imposes propositions and concepts (as truth-conditional) in
our ontology by forcing us to think of thoughts in a non-contingent, way and thus
assigning the notions of truth and falsity. Why are beliefs as propositions (as opposed
to belief states) needed in our quasi-inference from experience-types to belief states?
Because beliefs (as opposed to belief states) form the evidential reason — as opposed
to causal reason — for the conclusion. In the above quasi-inference STs mental state
l
‘its seeming to me that an apple is there” (e-i), and his belief state that there are no
countervailing factors {b-1), causally sustains his belief state of there being apples
there {b-2). In addition, e-1 and b-1 are also reasons for b-2 because they follow the
rule of apple usage involved within these states. So I call these states causal reasons.
These, however, are not the same as evidential reasons. Swain (1981) says,
First, there is the kind of reasons that we are referring to when we talk
about a person’s evidence
,
and it is here that the talk of believed (or, known)
propositions is appropriate. Second, there are what I call causal reasons for
a belief. Causal reasons are, among other things, events or states of the
person who has the belief Some of a person’s beliefs (which are states
of that person) are often among the causal reasons upon which another belief
(say, the belief that h) is based; the propositions believed may very well be
among the evidential reasons that this person has, and whether the belief
that h is justified may depend upon the evidential connection between these
propositions and h. Let us distinguish between two different kinds of basing.
When it is appropriate to state that a person’s belief is based upon some sort
of evidential propositions, then I shall say that the belief is evidentially based
upon the set of propositions in question, (p. 75)
When we talk about evidence, as Swain (1981) says, we usually talk about
propositions. In the above quasi-inference (from apple-type experience to the state
of believing an apple to be there) Si's causal reasons for the derived state of believing
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an apple to be there is his believing that there are no countervailing factors. To be
evidential reasons for the derived state, however, we must know what these additional
beliefs and the countervailing beliefs (in the case of the above quasi-inference) are; we
must think in terms of their content in ways such as these: “the lights are sufficient
for me to see an apple clearly”; “this is a time when apples grow”; “this is a good
place for apples to grow”
;
“all cases of apple-type inputs are caused by real apples
existing in the external world ’
. These additional propositions are not static but
dynamic because they can be refuted with further information. For example, when S
learns that non-real apples sometimes cause apple-type inputs, he assigns falsity to
the proposition that “all apple-type experiences are caused by real apples”
. Since we
have to apply the notion of falsity and, as we saw above, we cannot assign it directly
to a mental or belief state, we need to introduce propositions. According to default
reasoning, the evidences mentioned above are prima facie reasons for hypothesizing
that an apple is there, and they can be defeated or falsified by further evidence.
Hence, propositions must be introduced into our ontology.
6.2 Justification of Beliefs
The beliefs that are implicated in our quasi-inferences from experience-types to
belief states are propositions which we accept for the time being as prima facie
justified (meaning we can take them to be true for the time being) and which
might later be refuted. The question is, what is the justification for accepting these
propositions?
Ordinarily, a proposition is justified in one of the two ways: (1) By deriving
it logically from other propositions which are justified, or (2) its justification lies
within itself; in other words, it is self-justified. Propositions which express a priori
or logical truth
,
such as A=A, contain their justification within themselves. Empir-
ical propositions, on the other hand, are not logical truths and they can generally
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be justified only by deriving them — using logical methods — from some other
propositions which are themselves justified. For example, S believes that someone
drove a car down these tracks a while ago (p ) because he believes that there are
tiie marks running down the tracks ( q) and that whenever there are tire marks it
means that a car has passed (r); S derives p from q and r, and p is justified for
him so long as he accepts q and r to be true. So q and r are the basis (in Swains’s
words they are “evidences”) for S^s belief that p. Here the justification for p lies
outside p: it lies in q and r. But what is the justification of S1 s beliefs that q and r?
There appear to be two possibilities here: S might point to some other propositions
from which he derives his beliefs that q and r or he might say that these beliefs are
self-justified] their truths lie within themselves, and he is justified in accepting them
as true without the support of any other proposition.
The response just mentioned is problematic, however. If 5”s beliefs q and r
owe their justification to some further propositions, those further propositions need
justification in turn. Many philosophers would insist that this justification is possible
only if the other alternative is ultimately satisfied: that is, S must have self-justified
beliefs by reference to which any other sort of justified belief is ultimately justified.
Unfortunately, the most plausible examples of self-justifying beliefs are a priori truths
such as ‘A=A’ or ‘A yard is equal to three feet’, and these truths certainly provide
an inadequate basis for matters of fact and existence, as Hume described the objects
of empirical beliefs. Foundationalists such as R. Chisholm claim that self-justifying
beliefs that form the ultimate basis for empirical beliefs concern the nature and
identity of one’s own mental states. If such a view is not accepted, then, as the
foundationalists argue, we will end up with an infinite regress. Millar says that
proponents of this view usually have the following structure in mind:
It is obvious from the structure of Figure 6.1 that this chain of justification must
either terminate somewhere or there will be an infinite regress. The problem of
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Figure 6.1 Structure of Beliefs
infinite regress is particularly difficult here because, as I said earlier, I am using
here a regulative theory of justification according to which I must know that B l is
the appropriate kind of belief from which B can be derived. Such consideration of
the constraints on B 1 is not possible if the chain is infinitely long. What this shows
is that an inferential chain must end somewhere with beliefs which are legitimate
yet groundless. According to foundationalists, these are basic beliefs from which
other beliefs are derived. Usually the class of beliefs that are held to be basic
are observational beliefs. As Pollock (1987) says, “The simple motivation for a
foundations theory is the psychological observation that we have various ways of
sensing the world, and all knowledge comes to us via senses. The foundationalist
takes this to mean that our senses provide us with what are then identified as
epistemologically basic beliefs (construed broadly) (sic). Reasoning, it seems, can
justify us in holding a belief only if we are already justified in holding the beliefs
from which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification.
Only perception can do that. We thus acquire the picture of our beliefs forming a kind
of pyramid, with the basic beliefs provided by perception forming the foundation, and
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all other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning that traces back ultimately
to the basic beliefs” (p. 26).
The notion of “basic beliefs” needs some clarification. According to some found-
ationalists, observational beliefs such as “there is an apple in front of me”
(B
)
are properly basic beliefs. An important property of basic beliefs, foundationalists
contend, is incorrigibility. The problem here is to show how S’ s belief B can be
incorrigible. Foundationalists overcome this problem by reducing all such beliefs in
terms of appearance statements and then arguing that, although one can be mistaken
(or have erroneous perception) about an objective state of affairs, one can never be
mistaken about how it appears to him. Thus we can reduce B into foundationalists
vocabulary as follows: “it appears to me that there is an apple in front of me (S)”
{B1 ). As B x is about one’s own mental state, foundationalists argue, it is incorrigible
for S because one cannot be mistaken about one’s own mental state.
The notion of incorrigibility, as stated above, is not without problems. First
of all, as I said earlier, S may apply the concept of nectarine to his apple-type
experience and reach the experiential state “it seems that a nectarine is there”
;
the
latter state in turn sustains his belief state that a nectarine is there. Here, as in many
other cases, experience type and content has not meshed and this has resulted in a
belief state which is not well-grounded. As Millar says, “It is perhaps not obvious
that this could happen in the case of experiences such that it seems to you that a
red thing is there. Yet it seems possible in principle. If a person has the habit of
making over-hasty judgments about the colors of objects it could be that it seems
to him that a red thing is there on occasions in which he has a (brown-thing)-type
experience. But then such a person might conceivably make over-hasty judgments
about his visual experiences too, believing that they are (red-thing)-type when they
are not” (p. 174).
95
Further, there are some beliefs which seem to be incorrigible but in reality are not
so, for the believer may not know why that particular belief is incorrigible. Suppose
S believes in a complicated mathematical formula, p, which is derived from some
fundamental mathematical truths by the method of deduction. S may not know why
p is incorrigible. S believes p to be true as someone told him so; he himself, however,
has no idea of the deductive steps from which p followed.
Chisholm, a well-known foundationalist, says that a belief, say B\ is incorrigible
for S because it is “beyond reasonable doubt” for S. According to Chisholm, S is
justified in accepting a belief B x by virtue of the two epistemic principles that he
accepts:
• If S accepts B\ then Bl tends to be probable.
• If 5” accepts B and if B l is not discontinued by Bs total belief system then 51
is probable for 5°.
Now, given the two principles, the question is, can we justify Bs accepting B l
as beyond reasonable doubt”? I think we cannot. First of all, B l is an empirical
statement and to justify any empirical statement we have to take account of the
observer (is S a kind of observer who is in the habit of seeing red apples?), 5°s
means of observation (is this the place conducive to someone seeing red apples?), the
background conditions of 5”s observation (can one see anything properly in this light,
specially red round things?), none of which are considered by Chisholm. Second,
I contend, following Aune (1991), that Chisholm’s justification of the above two
principles is erroneous. According to Chisholm, both the above principles can be
justified by an a priori truth which is a conditional statement, the antecedent of
which is a general presupposition and the consequent of which is one of the above
principles. The general presupposition is this:
9 This is a modified version of what Aune (1991) gives p. 182.
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I am justified in believing that I can improve and correct my system of beliefs.
Of those that are about matters of interest and concern to me, I can eliminate
the ones that are unjustified and add others that are justified; and I can replace
less justified beliefs about these topics by beliefs that are more justified.
Chisholm’s claim is that the following conditional, whose antecedent is the above
general proposition and whose consequent is the second principle stated above, is an
a priori truth:
If S is justified in believing that he can improve and correct his system of
beliefs such that he can eliminate the ones that are unjustified and add others
that are justified and can replace less justified beliefs about these topics by
beliefs that are more justified, then if S accepts B1 and Bl is not discontinued
by S*s total belief system, B 1 is probable for S.
Chisholm claims that from the above conditional statement and the general pre-
supposition we can derive the consequent, which is the second principle as above,
by using Modus Ponens. What are the grounds for accepting the above conditional
statement as a priori truth? And what reason is there to say that the fact that one
is justified in correcting and improving one’s belief system shows that if one accepts
a belief B 1
,
then B l tends to be probable for one? Chisholm has no answer to
either of these questions. Aune says, “The conceptual gap between antecedent and
consequent here is really enormous, and if the claim that the conditional is actually
true a priori is to be taken seriously, we should be given some indication how it can
be proved a priori — that is, how it can be derived from a priori axioms” (p. 184).
Chisholm does not show how the above conditional statement can be derived from
apiori axioms. Hence, we cannot depend on foundationalism or Chisholm’s theory to
provide justification for the additional propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences
from experience-types to belief states.
According to the Coherence theory, an empirical belief is justified neither because
of its incorrigiblity nor because it is derivable from an incorrigible belief but because
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it coheres globally with other beliefs. Thus Coherence Theory rejects the idea of a
special class of beliefs which are epistemologically basic. Here I shall consider the
views of two coherentists, Lehrer (1974/5/81/82) and BonJour (1985). According
to Lehrer, S is justified in holding belief B l if it is more probable than its competing
beliefs. We can describe the “competing” beliefs of Bl as (1) those beliefs which are
incompatible with Bl and (2) some of those beliefs which are compatible with B l .
Lehrer considers the case of lottery. Suppose S has a ticket in a fair lottery of 1000
tickets where each ticket has a fair chance of being drawn and hence his ticket has
1/1000 probability of being drawn. On the basis of this knowledge, S can conclude
two things: (1) that no ticket will be drawn (B\) which is incompatible with the
belief that at least one ticket will be drawn (£) 10
; (2) his ticket will not be drawn
(B ) as it has only 1/1000 chance of being drawn. S has equally good reason to
conclude for each of the other 999 tickets (
B
2
... ET) that each ticket has 1/1000
chance of being drawn. Each of these beliefs (B
2
... Bn
) are negatively relevant to B.
Now, for Lehrer belief B l of S competes with his beliefs B2 ...B™, and, as I said above,
they are ‘negatively relevant’ to B l . From this S cannot conclude of any particular
belief that it will be drawn. Thus, for Lehrer, B l on the assessment of B2 ... S’1 is
more probable than B l without such assessment. Further, take the case of &s belief
that an apple is there (B2 ). B2 is assessed in relation to other beliefs such as, “What
S is seeing is not a plastic imitation apple, or a nectarine which are all “negatively
relevant” to it.” If we consider B2 in relation to all the beliefs that are negatively
relevant to it then it is more probable than if we consider B2 just by itself.
I do not agree with Lehrer’s Coherence theory. This theory assumes that we
have to take account of the vast web of our beliefs. Pollock (1986) says that this
assumption does not take into account the difference between occurrent and non-
occurrent beliefs. We have access only to our occurrent beliefs and not to our non-
10One assumption that Lehrer makes is that we cannot make contradictory beliefs.
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occurrent beliefs. Further, Lehrer’s theory is incompatible with the Coherentist’s own
version of “a basing relation” which is, of course, distinct from the foundationalist’s
notion of a basing relation. According to the foundationalists, as we saw earlier, one
belief is justified in relation to another and so on, until we reach a special class of
beliefs which do not require anything else for their justification; they are self-justified.
In Coherence Theory there is no special class of beliefs in relation to which other
beliefs are formed. S first judges if Bl coheres with the rest of his beliefs and then
accepts B l on the basis of judgment. Pollock objects to this sort of basing as (1)
we do not ordinarily have such doxastic reconstruction of basing and (2) there is
a circularity here: 5” first has to justify that Bl coheres with the rest of his beliefs
and then believe that B l coheres with the rest of our beliefs on the basis of that
justification. The question is, which comes first — the justification or the belief?
Lehrer’s theory does not give any answer to this question.
L. BonJour adheres to the Coherence Theory of truth. Like Lehrer he too believes
that justification is holistic. The way he has set up his theory, however, gives the
appearance of linear justification; B\ for BonJour, is justified in relation to B2 .
This semblance of linear justification is soon vanished when justification is made
“global”. Beliefs, for BonJour, really are only “contextually basic”. This notion
of linear justification is brought in because in everyday ordinary life we justify one
belief, B l
,
in relation to another, B2 . According to BonJour, the notion of coherence
is “truth-conducive”. Justification of B l consists of the following notions: (1) mutual
consistency of B 1 with other beliefs of the observer; (2) inferribility of Bl from other
belief of the observer; (3) explanatory verification of B l \ (4) relatively long term
stability of B 1 under persistent observational input. Observations can be directly or
indirectly verified in principle. Confirmation is local and conditional depending on
observers, observables, background, etc. Thus Bl has to be justified in the context
of the position of the observer (was there sufficient light from where the observer was
perceiving the apple?), the observation (a real apple in midst of a bunch of plastic
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apples could have been been misperceived), the background of the observer (is he a
person who, whenever he sees red round things, thinks that they are apples?).
The Coherence Theory of justification suffers from some vital problems. First,
as with Lehrer’s theory, the coherence theory talks of beliefs which are stored only
in the short term memory and not in the long term memory. Second, if coherence
is only amongst beliefs, then, one might ask, how can our beliefs connect to the
real world? Also, is there empirical support to show that one has an overall grasp of
one’s system of beliefs? BonJour simply accepts it in terms of what he calls “doxastic
presumption”
. Aune says,
We may justifiably presume that we have a relatively specific system of beliefs
when we raise the question of how those beliefs can be justified, but if
we consider the wider question of how our propositional attitudes can be
rationally assessed, a doxastic presumption puts the cart before the horse.
To be sure, philosophers have historically expressed little doubt about our
ability to monitor our thoughts and beliefs, but this estimate should appear
excessively optimistic to a reader of Freud or Dostoyevsky. As these writers
emphasize, self-deception is ubiquitious in everyday life, and people who are
deceived about their personality and character are commonly deceived about
some of their beliefs, (p. 187)
Further, in choosing a hypothesis BonJour considers a limited number of pro-
positions from which to choose. He does not justify why he chose a limited number
of hypotheses and did not consider others. He does not even justify why he left
out, say, Goodman’s hypothesis from this set. Hence, BonJour’s theory cannot be
accepted.
The question of how a belief can justifiably be regarded as legitimate, groundless,
and yet not self-evident, has been discussed by Millar (1991). According to him, a
proposition or belief, p, can be accepted by S as legitimate yet groundless if, and
only if, p is normative for S , or, as Millar says, accords with 5^s evaluative practices.
Following Wittgenstein (1958), Millar says that the status of such normative propos-
itions are like the rules of the game that we take beyond doubt, dispute, and the need
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for support. Millar further contends that p must constitute part of S's perspective
on the world and hence should not require any justification. Millar says that given
any group, G, we can say that G shares a perspective if the people in that group
believe that some of the constituent concepts and propositions of that group can be
held as legitimate without needing any other justification (this is the same as taking
these propositions to be normative). Millar says,
If a proposition is normative for a group it is treated by the group as be-
ing indisputable. This does not mean that if people think a proposition is
normative they treat it as being indisputable. In general people do not think
of propositions as being normative and otherwise. It means that normative
propositions are ones which, among other things, people treat as being in-
disputable. Their being treated in this way is part of what it is for them
to be normative. Doubt in relation to such propositions is ruled out, as
Wittgenstein says. But many of the examples which Wittgenstein considers
are not ones with respect to which it could be plausible to suppose that doubt
is ruled out absolutely. It is possible to imagine contexts in which doubt, and
with it dispute, could naturally and sensibly arise. This presents no problem
for the proposed conception of normativity since according to that conception
there need be nothing intrinsic to that propositions themselves, nothing about
the propositions qua contents, which rules out doubt on the part of those who
grasp them. Thus they need not be intrinsically self-evident in the way that
the proposition that a triangle has three sides has been alleged to be. If this
is right then we should not think of groups for whom certain propositions are
normative as being forover bound by their normativity. Such groups would
look askance at doubt about propositions in question which were not backed
up by any reasons for doubt, a point which Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses.
But this is not to say that there could not be, or that the groups could not
recognize, grounds for doubting some of the propositions which are normative
for them (p. 183).
The following beliefs are normative for Millar because one is justified in holding them
although there are no grounds for doing so:
• Mountains exist for a very long time.
• Things do not vanish or cease to exit when you stop looking at them for a very
long time.
101
Similarly, one might say that the propositions implicated in quasi-inferences are
groundless yet legitimate. In other words, they are normative. Sceptics may raise
some objections against normative propositions. Granted that some normative pro-
positions are “genuinely basic”
,
what guarantee is there that some so called normative
propositions are not believed because of credulity and dogmatism? Suppose all the
people in a tribe, T
,
share the basic belief that articles made of bronze change color
during eclipse. For T, then, the following proposition is normative:
• Articles made of bronze change color during eclipses.
(B)
According to Millar, B is, for the people of T, a legitimate yet groundless belief; in
other words, B is normative for the people of T. It was found out later by anthropolo-
gists that the tribesmen believed the above proposition because of superstition; hence,
it is not a legitimate belief even though it accords with their evaluative practices.
The problem with Millar’s normitivity-thesis is that there is no criteria to distinguish
between normative propositions that are apt to be true and those that are apt to be
false.
Millar says that since our aim is truth-indicative, we should believe or take
into account only those propositions which are genuinely true. Millar puts two
constraints on propositions which we can use to judge whether a proposition is
properly normative; these two constraints are as follows:
1. If p is a normative proposition for S and p conflicts with other beliefs for which
S has adequate grounds then S cannot hold p.
2. S cannot accept any proposition, p , he pleases in the absence of adequate
grounds.
Most sceptics would deny that those constraints yield universal or general pro-
positions. I consider their position and my criticism of it in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7
Justifying Propositions That Are
Implicated in Quasi-Inference
My primary aim in this chapter is to consider some additional theories for justify-
ing the general propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences from experience type
to belief states. In this chapter I discuss induction and its criticism. I also critically
survey the Hypothetico-deductive method and Inference to the Best Explanation as
possible alternatives to traditional inductive methods.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In section 1 I present the inductive
justification of general propositions and Hume’s, Russell’s, and Goodman’s criticism
of induction. I also critically survey the Hypothetico-deductive method of inference.
In section 2 I critically survey Inference to the Best Explanation and its relation to a
simple version of Bayes’s theorem. I end the chapter with a brief note on epistemic
means and ends.
7.1 Inductive Justification: Criticisms of Hume, Russell, and Goodman
and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method
We saw in the last chapter that according to Millar the general propositions
implicated in our quasi-inferences play a ‘normative’ role within our evaluative prac-
tices. Millar put two constraints on the kind of propositions that can be considered
normative; these constraints are means to avoid the objections of the sceptics. The
sceptics, however, find these two constriants unsuitable for filtering out propositions
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that one dogmatically accepts. If so, then what is the justification of these additional
propositions implicated in quasi-inference ?
The propositions implicated in our quasi-inferences are all universal or general.
According to Hume, such propositions are all covert causal principles. Hume said
that by observing the constant conjunction of A’s and B> s, S reaches the general
conclusion that A causes B or that All A ’s are B’s. Such a conclusion is based on &s
natural instinct or inclination and not on any ‘rule’ such as Modus Ponens (as in case
of deductive inference). To take a concrete example, S, having observed some swans
to be white, concludes that all swans are white. Here the “inductive leap” from the
particular to the universal does not follow any rule; according to Hume, S makes the
“leap” by experiencing the constant conjunction of swanness and whiteness. Thus,
S', according to Hume, makes this “inductive leap” instinctively and not rationally.
We can leply to Hume by saying that although in the above case (concerning the
color of swans) there is no deductive rule working to produce the conclusion, there is
an inductive rule working which produced the conclusion; hence, we can argue that
the conclusion is rational. In the case of the swans, S can rationalize the passage
from the premise to the conclusion in the following manner: n/m of the swans S
observed were found to have the property of being white; hence, he concluded that
probably n/m of all swans are white. This observation is based on the practical rule
of induction and not on any natural instinct. The rule is as follows: If n/m of the
members of a large, randomly selected class of things of kind (E) have been observed
to possess a property (G), then one may infer that n/m of all E’s probably have G.
In recent times the rule of induction has been criticized by Russell and Goodman.
Since induction is not supposed (by anyone) to yield certain conclusions, the fact
that it will sometimes give a false conclusion from true premises is not surprizing.
Russell (1948) argues, however, that the rule will give rise to false conclusions from
true premises as often as not. Russell reached his conclusion by considering the
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evidence class and the much wider class that it is supposed to represent. According to
Russell, either some restrictions, unknown to anyone, should be put on the allowable
means of specifying these classes or the inductive rule can give rise to erroneous
inferences as often as not. Let us apply Russell’s reasoning to the inductive principle
that I have given above. Suppose S is considering the property of being observed.
For his purpose, S observes some cows. Since all cows observed by S have this
property, he can conclude, using the inductive principle, that all cows are observed.
Further, if he thinks of the observed cows as being members of the larger group of
physical objects, then, using the above principle, he can also draw the ridiculous
conclusion that all physical objects are observed by S. Aune says (1991), “Cavils
about whether my observations are made randomly (a possibility that Russell did
not discuss) will not dispose of the problem because if my observation of cows do
not count as “random”
,
no observation that a person can make will have this status,
and the principle of inductive generalization will be rendered useless for experimental
purposes” (p. 164).
Like Russell, Goodman also showed that there are problems with induction;
he showed how a given body of hypotheses may give equal support to conflicting
conclusions. To make his point, Goodman used artificial predicates like “grue”; he
defines the latter as follows:
• X is grue =def X is green and examined before the year 2000 or X is blue and
examined after the year 2000.
By observing some emeralds and finding that they are green, we reach the following
two conclusions:
• All emeralds are green.
• All emeralds are grue.
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In case of emeralds before the year 2000 there are no problems with these two
generalizations; according to both generalizations, emeralds are green. But there is a
pioblem with emeralds examined after the year 2000. According to one generalization
they are green, according to another generalization they are blue (or not-green). Since
both generalizations are logically confirmed by the inductive rule, that rule must be
defective.
The above problems with the inductive rule brought about by Hume, Russell, and
Goodman show that the inductive rule cannot be accepted. In recent times induction
has been replaced by the Hypothetico- deductive method (H-D method), which is
often thought to avoid the problems faced by induction. Instead of generalizations
from particular instances we can think of these general propositions as hypotheses
to be tested. According to the H-D method, we fix a field of enquiry and try to
find explanations (reasons) for some phenomena; we hypothesize some reasons and
predict consequences from those hypotheses. If the predictions are true then the
hypotheses can be confirmed to a certain degree; if they are false then the hypothesis
is discontinued. Let us try to understand this method by applying it to the following
case of elephants. Here the field of enquiry is the color of elephants. On the basis
of STs previous experience he has reached the general conclusion “all elephants are
black
r
. Suppose while travelling through a particular part of Africa S encounters
white elephants, and, instead of thinking that they are exceptions (or mutants), he
formulates the hypothesis that such elephants are a local subspecies. Next S tries
to actually test this hypothesis; he predicts that there are more white elephants. He
soon finds that there are many white elephants in that locality and that the offsprings
of these elephants are also white; on the basis of this observation S can say that his
above hypothesis is confirmed to certain degree. Aune (1970) says,
The basic strategy of the new method is to predict on the basis of a hypothesis
that certain events will occur under specified conditions and then check these
predictions for accuracy. Schematically, this strategy may be expressed as
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follows. If H is a hypothesis or a general assumption and C is the set of
conditions under which a certain result R is expected, then the forms of
inference used to confirm or refute H are these:
Both schemata are highly simplified, and the important notion of a degree
of confirmation is not properly defined. The essential idea, however, is
this: If predictions based on H are frequently made and if, in addition, the
predicted R obtains whenever the stipulated conditions C clearly obtain (for
many different Rs and Cs), then the degree of support or confirmation for
H becomes progressively higher. If, on the other hand, a predicted R fails
when the condition C clearly obtain, then the hypothesis H must be modified
or rejected. The latter alternative is rejected by deductive logic. By the
logical principle of modus tollens
,
if H and C imply R, then if R is false, the
conjuction of C and H is also false. A conjunction is false, however, when at
least one of its members or conjuncts is false; if C is granted to be true, it
must therefore follow, solely by the laws of deductive logic, that H is false as
well. (p. 155).
Let us see if this new method can solve the Goodman problem. Take the case of
emeralds as above. Instead of generalization from particular cases we can think of
the two propositions “All emeralds are grue” and “All emeralds are green” as rival
hypotheses to be tested. We can now make the following predictions from the above
two propositions:
• The next emerald will be green.
• The next emerald will be grue.
The problem here is that we can test our predictions only before the year 2000
and not afterwards; hence, using the hypothetico-deductive method, both will be
supported to an equal degree by the success or failure of the predictions we can
Confirmation
If H and C, then R
C obtains.
R obtains.
Refutation
If H and C, then R
C obtains.
R does not obtain.
Therefore, H is,
to a degree, confirmed.
Therefore, H is
refuted.
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make. The obvious thing to do at this point is to modify the hypothetico-deductive
method. I discuss the modification of H-D method in the next section.
7.2 Inference to the Best Explanation
We should amend the hypothetico-deductive method by requiring one to choose
the best hypothesis that accounts for the data. This amended version of the hypothetico-
deductive method is generally called Inference to the Best Explanation. According
to Inference to the Best Explanation
,
one can use several criteria by which to choose
the best hypotheses. The names of these criteria are as follows: (1) Simplicity,
(2) Testibility, (3) Coherence with established hypotheses, (4) Explanatory Power.
For example, suppose we are considering two hypotheses, h and h-1, for explaining
evidence e; if we choose h over h-1 because h-1 is simpler, directly testible, coheres
better with other established hypotheses, and explains more facts than h-1
,
then we
have applied Inference to the Best Explanation. G. Harman (1965) observes,
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis
would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there
will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be
able to reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making
the inference. Thus one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis
would provide a better explanation for the evidence than would any other
hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true.
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to judge that one hypothesis
is sufficiently better than another hypothesis. Presumably such a judgment
would be based on considerations such as which hypothesis is simpler, which
is more plausible, which explains more, which is less ad hoc and so forth
Uses of inference to the best explanation are manifold. When a detective
puts the evidence together and decides that it must have been the butler,
he is reasoning that no other explanation which accounts for all the facts is
plausible enough or simple enough to be accepted. When a scientist infers
the existence of atoms and subatomic particles, he is inferring the truth of
an explanation for various data which he wishes to account for. These seems
the obvious cases; but there are many others. When we infer that a witness
is telling the truth, our inference goes as follows: (i) we infer that he says
what he does because he believes it; (ii) we infer that he believes what he
108
does because he actually did witness the situation which he describes. That
is, our confidence in his testimony is based on our conclusion about the
most plausible explanation for that testimony (if, for example, he stands togain a great deal from our believing him). Or, to take a different sort of
example, when we infer from a person’s behavior to some fact about his
mental experience, we are inferring that the latter fact explains better than
some other explanation what he does. It seems to me that these examples ofinference (and, of course many other similar examples) are easily described
as instances of the inference to the best explanation (p. 89 ).
Sceptics may raise some doubts about Inference to the Best Explanation. First
of all, they will ask, Why should we accept criteria as simplicity, comprehensibility,
etc.?” Further, they may also raise the following question: “What is the degree to
which an hypothesis is confirmed by a given item of evidence?”
.
One can answer the above questions by introducing probabilistic reasoning in
Inference to the Best Explanation. Probabilistic reasoning can be introduced by an
application of Bayes’s theorem such as follows:
• P(h given e)= P(h)P(e given h)/P(e)
According to this theorem, the probability of a hypothesis given certain evid-
ence can be ascertained by computing the probability of the hypothesis times the
probability of the evidence given the hypothesis and divide the entire product by
the probability of the evidence. Thus, by using the above theorem, I can compute
the probability of this wood being rosewood given that it is red. I first compute
the product of the probability of rosewoods in the world and the probability of
anything being red given that it is rosewood, and then divide the entire product by
the probability of red things. If there is more rosewood in the world (compared to
other types of woods) then the probability of this wood being rosewood increases;
again, if there are few red things in the world then the probability of this wood being
rosewood also increases. Mathematically, if the numerator is large then the left hand
side of the equation increases; if the denominator is small then the left hand side also
increases.
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To apply the above theorem, we must use propositions which already have prob-
ability values. In the above case we chose h because h has a higher probability value
than its alternatives. The question now is, “What is the justification of assigning a
higher probability value to h or, in this case, what is the justification for assigning a
higher probability value to the proposition this is rosewood,?”. One might believe that
the proposition this is teakwood (r) has a higher probability value than h; he would
then replace h by r. Surely, such assignments of probability value, one who adheres
to Bayes’s theorem would argue, cannot be arbitrary. How, then, are probability
values assigned? One can answer as follows: The probability values assigned to the
hypotheses look as if each hypothesis has an absolute probability value. But in reality
most hypotheses are probable in relation to a further probability
;
in other words,
most of these hypotheses (except the initial ones which have absolute probability
values) are probable m relation to the probability value of some other proposition.
Thus each probability assignment must be indexed by its relative value; this is known
as the rule of conditioning. When we use propositions in Bayes’s theorem these
relative probability values are implicit. Thus, we chose the hypothesis “this wood
is rosewood” over other hypotheses, in the above case, because it has the highest
relative probability value. The above answer, however, gives rise to a problem: Since
all probabilities are relative how can an initial probability be assigned? “Radical
Bayesians” attempt to solve the problem by giving the strategy the I give below.
There are various ways of interpreting probabilities and one of them is the
subjective interpretation of the probability calculus which was adopted by some
statisticians influenced by C.S. Peirce. According to the subjectivists view, the
probability value is the degree of value an individual, 5, assigns to a hypothesis,
h. Thus two people starting with different “opinions” (subjective probabilities)
can go on “updating” their probabilities, and by persistently using the rule of
conditioning their “opinions” converge; in other words, subjective probability gives
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rise to objective probability. Suppose S and P are planning to toss coins. S has two
coins in his pocket one of which is fair and the other coin is biased - it has 0.7
chance of landing head. Both 5 and P know about this. Now 5. for the purpose of
tossing, pulls out a coin blindly from his pocket and P claims that it is the biased
one. P thinks that the chances are 0.9 that the coin is biased and S thinks that
the chances are 0.5 that the coin is biased. So S and P start with different prior
probabilities about the coin. In the tables below I show that by persistently using
the rule of conditioning the difference in the mathematical values of ,5"s and P's
priors gradually diminish 1
. Likelihood (LK1) is mathematical value given a certain
hypothesis and a posterior is the mathematical value obtained by multiplying the
prior and the likelihood and divided by the sum; the posterior becomes (in the case
below) becomes the new prior probability of the next throw:
Initial Disagreement is 0.4
P
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.5000 0.0156 0.0078 0.4196
Biased 0.5000 0.0216 0.0108 0.5804
S
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.1000 0.0156 0.0016 0.0744
Biased 0.9000 0.0216 0.0194 0.9256
1 Here I am using the following theorem of Bayes: P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/ P(h)P(e
given h)+P(-h)P(e given -h).
New Disagreement is 0.345276
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Disagreement is 0.345276
P
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.4196 0.0156 0.0066 0 . 3433
Biased 0.5804 0.0216 0.0125 0.6567
S
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.0744 0.0156 0.0012 0.0549
Biased 0.9256 0.0216 0.0200 0.9451
New Disagreement is 0.288429
Disagreement is 0.288429
P
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.3433 0.0156 0.0054 0.2743
Biased 0.6567 0.0216 0.0142 0.7257
S
112
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.0549 0.0156 0.0009 0.0403
Biased 0.9451 0.0216 0.0204 0.9597
New Disagreement is 0.234027
Disagreement is 0.234027
P
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.2743 0.0156 0.0043 0.2147
Biased 0.7257 0.0216 0.0157 0.7853
S
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.0403 0.0156 0.0006 0.0295
Biased 0.9597 0.0216 0.0207 0.9705
New Disagreement is 0.185200
Disagreement is 0.185200
P
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Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.2147 0.0156 0.0034 0.1650
Biased 0.7853 0.0216 0.0170 0.8350
S
Hyp Priors Lkl Prior*Lkl Posterior
Fair 0.0295 0.0156 0.0005 0.0215
Biased 0.9705 0.0216 0.0210 0.9785
New Disagreement is 0.143550
As we saw above, the difference between STs and Ps opinions, represented by
mathematical values, gradually diminish; radical Bayesians claim that these opinions
ultimately converge. Aune (1991) observes that the kind of reasoning which is
used in the above case (showing that the different opinions converge by persistant
conditioning) cannot be accepted as unqualified. To employ such reasoning the
investigator (in this case S and P) must make some contingent assumptions. The
acceptability of these assumptions “Is not dictated by the evidence of the throws or
probability theory” (Aune 1991 p. 210). I said before that the theorem I have used
above is as follows: P(h given e)=P(h)P(e given h)/P(h)P(e given h)+P(-h)P(e
given
-h). (See footnote as above) 2
.The disjunction “the coin is fair or the coin is
biased” is conjectured to be equivalent to “the coin is fair or not- (the coin is fair)” as
“The denominator in this theorem is a sum which is obtained by adding the tautology (h or
not-h) to the evidence e. Since e is logically equivalent to e & (h and not-h), we can say, by the
probability calculus, that P(e) is logically equivalent to P(e &: h and not-h). The denominator of the
simpler version of the theorem [see above] ‘P(e)\ may be replaced by ‘P(e & (h or not-h))’ which
is equivalent, according to the axioms of the probability calculus, to the complex denominator of
our above theorem.
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the hypothesis “not-(the coin is fair)” and “the coin is biased 0.7 towards heads” is
conjectured to be equivalent. The problem here is that “biased” cannot be taken to
mean in this case “not-(the coin is fair)”, but instead “biased towards head 0.9”. The
equivalence, as Aune says, is not included in the reasoning pertaining to convergence
but can only be accepted by one on a contingent basis. Hence, the convergence of
subjective opinion into objectivity, which radical Bayesians emphasize, to is not
unqualified and cannot be defended a priori.
7.2.1 Epistemic Ends and Norms
In this subsection I offer a solution to the problem I raised earlier about the initial
hypotheses. The initial or prior hypotheses needed to apply Bayes’s theorem are not
intrinsically certain; nonetheless, we are justified in holding them because, as I show
here, they contribute to a rationally unobjectionable epistemic end and norm that
we have adopted. Thus, we can justify these hypotheses normatively.
Accepting a hypothesis is doing a certain action or exhibiting a certain kind
of behavior. As Aune says, we can evaluate such actions S’s accepting p as being
epistemically permissible. I use the word “permissible” here in the same sense as
it is used in the command “you are permitted to take off your seat belts when the
seat belt sign goes off”. What constitutes such permissibility? As I said earlier,
in epistemic context it is permissible for S to accept a proposition p if doing so
contributes to an epistemic end or norm that we have accepted and if the end or
norm is not rationally objectionable.
It is possible to conceive that our end or goal in epistemology is to attain
knowledge and hence we must accept only those propositions that contribute to
our goal; we must, in that case, admit into our epistemological framework only those
propositions which are absolutely certain. The problem with this goal is that it
is too strong, and if we adopt it then the only propositions that we can justifiably
accept are mathematical and logical ones. This severely restricts the scope of rational
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investigation; hence, we must abandon the search for certainty and aim at something
more modest. My aim (similar to what the coherentists aim at) is to obtain a
conceptual framework which is simple, has strong explanatory power, is maximally
consistent, and has a significant degree of fidelity3
. Simplicity is a property of
conceptual scheme which has no redundant concepts and has a minimum number of
explanatory principles; “comprehensiveness” refers to the whole world being covered
by the scheme, both intensively and extensively; and “fidelity” refers to minimal
error compatible with the realization of other epistemic values. Since these are
the properties we desire in a conceptual scheme, we are not forbidden (or we are
epistemically permitted) to choose hypotheses (propositions) that contribute toward
their exemplification. Further, there is nothing rationally objectionable in seeking a
conceptual scheme which is simpler than its alternative, more comprehensive, and
is maximally consistent yet minimally redundant. Thus I choose the hypothesis h
over hi not because the truth of h is guaranteed (there is no such thing as factual
certainty) but because I am permitted to choose h in relation to my epistemic norms.
As Aune (1991) says,
I suggest that, if the end is to obtain a maximally comprehensive yet min-
imally simple conceptual scheme that can reasonably be hoped to be minim-
ally erroneous, two sorts of epistemic standards are appropriate. The first
prescribes policies that actively promote the end. To obtain the intended
comprehensiveness in one’s scheme, for example, one should seek “causes”
or explanations for observed phenomena; and to obtain the simplicity and
systematic connection in the scheme, one should minimize redundancy, at-
tempt to subsume disparate phenomena under common principles, eliminate
nomological danglers, and so forth. Conceptual activity will be epistemically
permissible only when it accords with such policies (p. 191).
Moreover, it should be noted that the status of the initial probability are somewhat
like observation statements. In accepting the latter needed to apply Bayes’s theorem
we take into account certain assumptions such as, “The observer is a dependable
3
1 have adopted these criteria from Aune (1991).
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one
,
‘This is a place suitable for this kind of observation”; these assumptions are
ail regarding background of observation, observer, process of observation, without
questioning them. These assumptions are all empirical and if we try to justify them
with the help of other assumptions (which are also empirical) then what we are doing
is, as Clark Glymore (1980) says, “intellectual bootstrapping”. These assumptions
should make our hypothesis consistent with our other beliefs. Similarly, we accept
some initial hypotheses because they (1) are consistent with our other beliefs which
are reasonably justified; (2) we regard them as provisional and can change them in
the light of further knowledge. Aune says, “If an inferred belief is held in a properly
tentative spirit by one who has the will to consider what can be said against it and to
levise or reject it if contrary evidence become available, it will then be held critically
and I can allow that the believer will be epistemically justified in accepting it for the
time being” (p. 192).
We always choose our hypothesis from a set of alternatives. The following
question may be question may be asked by the sceptics: “What is the justification of
choosing these limited number of alternatives and not others?” One can reply that
we consider a limited number of alternative hypotheses because it is not humanly
possible to consider all the alternatives to a hypothesis; we consider only those
hypotheses which have some presumptions in their favor. We do so, however, in a
critical spirit and with an open mind, and we should be ready to consider any new
hypotheses that is relevant. In considering these limited number of alternatives we
are doing our epistemic best.
Goodman’s problem may be mentioned here. According to Goodman, as we
saw earlier, there is no way to decide between the two confliciting hypotheses ( “all
emeralds are green” and “all emeralds are grue”) in order to explain the color of
emeralds after the year 2000. One who adheres to Bayes’s Theorem might say that
we should give the grue hypothesis a low prior probability as colors of things do not
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change over time. Aune (1991) observes, however, that this is not a good solution
because, “The character of our evidence about color changes is one of the things put
in question by Goodman's hypothesis” (p. 194). There is, in fact, no rational criteria
by which we can choose the green hypothesis over the grue hypothesis; nonetheless,
there is a pragmatic criteria. We choose the green hypothesis, as Aune observes,
because it accords better with our descriptive policy and thus makes our induction
consistent. Since our epistemic end, as I mentioned above, is to have a maximally
consistent system and since consistency of thought is better than inconsistency, we
prefer the green hypothesis over the grue hypothesis.
To summarize, beliefs (or what we believe to exist) are introduced into our
ontology due to defeasible reasoning. These beliefs (propositions) form the eviden-
tial reasons of our derived belief states in the quasi-inference from experience type to
belief state. I have tried to justify these propositions by using Inference to the Best
Explanation. I have interpreted the latter in terms of Bayes’s theorem. One problem
of applying the latter is that we have to start with hypotheses which already have
probability values. Although most hypotheses have relative probability values, the
initial ones are absolute. We are justified in adopting some initial hypotheses because
they accord with the epistemic norms or ends that we have adopted. In accepting
these initial hypotheses we have to remember that these are empirical propositions
and cannot be absolutely certain; nonetheless, we can go on revising them in the
light of further information.
As a result of my discussion with Professor Aune I realized that we have to make a distinction
here between what we BELIEVE TO EXIST and what we BELIEVE TO BE TRUE or REGARD
AS WORTHY OF ACCEPTANCE. To say that we admit propositions into our ontology is to say
that we believe there are such things as propositions. Thus, when I speak of the epistemic goal of
accepting only those propositions that are certain, the consequence is that we accept only those
propositions as justifiably relied upon, used as premisses, etc.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
In this dissertation I have shown that we can trace quasi-inferential patterns in
case of certain transitions between our sensory-experiences and our belief states.
My primary arguments for establishing the above thesis are drawn from my theories
of belief states, experiential states, and conceptual abilities. Following Edelman I
have showed that belief states are states of primary consciousness whose intrinsic
feature is recognition; in biological terms they are maps of neural maps (reentrant
loops) which get connected to value category memory that endows value or meaning
to these maps. Further, experiential states, like belief states, as I said in chapter
3, are also biological states. The difference between these two types of states is the
way recognition features into them. While recognition is an intrinsic feature of belief
states, it is merely an extrinsic feature of an experiential state. Also, in chapter 2 I
developed the operational theory of concepts according to which to know the meaning
of a concept (or word) is to know its proper usage in natural language. According
to this theory, an individual, S, for instance, has the concept of an X only when S
knows an X to be an A, or only when S can use X according to the standard usage
of the natural language to which X belongs. In chapter 4 I traced the inferential
patterns that are instantiated by certain transitions between experience-types and
belief states. In chapter 5 I discussed why we need to introduce propositions into
our ontology: Beliefs, as propositions, are implicated in our quasi-inference from
experience-types to belief states. In chapter 6 I discussed the problem of justifying
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these propositions. There are, however, a number of crucial issues that I have not
developed in this dissertation; I touch on these issues in the next few pages.
In chapter 1 I criticized Schank’s notion of reasoning; according to Schank and
researchers in Artificial Intelligence in general, reasoning is a matter of symbolic
manipulation. According to this theory, as I pointed out in chapter 1, any entity,
human or machine, can be said to be reasoning if it can make implicit and explicit
connection among propositions. Based on this view important researches were
conducted to reproduce intelligence or reasoning artificially most of which did not
succeed in fulfilling their goal.
The failure to reproduce human intelligence artificially is usually blamed upon by
researchers on lack of funding and technological development. Contrary to this view.
I contend that the failure is due primarily to scientific-philosophical reasons. These
researchers had faulty concepts regarding human reasoning and concept acquisition.
Moreover, they had no scientific theory from which to derive a consistent theory of
human leasoning. In the course of this dissertation I have tried to develop theories
regarding human reasoning based on Edelman’s view of the nervous system. I
have also developed a theory of concept acquisition consistent with my notion of
reasoning or inference. The importance of this notion and its failure to capture
human reasoning becomes apparent from a historical investigation of the rise and
failure of AI research. Apart from philosophical theories, something must be said
about the actual research pertaining to “intelligent machines” — something that I
have left out in the main body of this dissertation because of its “non-philosophical”
nature 1 .
The attempt to create “intelligent machines” (those which passed Turing Test)
got heavily funded in the early 50’s. This period led to a growth of enormous
1
1 am indebted to graduate student Ricardo Flores, Department of Philosophy University of
California San Diego, for helpful discussion on the subject of AI research.
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research in intelligent machines". The first machines were mere “number crunch-
ers", no more powerful than an oriental abacus. They followed strict mechanical
mathematical rules and, given some mathematical inputs, they could produce some
mathematical output. Gradually, as the science of Cybernetics developed, these
number crunchers" became “symbol crunchers” as vectors, sets, and letters, re-
placed numbers. Cybernetics developed into two distinct branches — (1) machines
based on Von Neumann mathematics (or digital computers) whose assumption was
that cognition is a matter of heuristics and (2) neural nets. The latter were electrical
circuits modeled on the brain’s physiology — the only structure known to exhibit
intelligence— which like humans could gather data from the environment and “learn”
as humans do.
The first attempt to develop “intelligent Von Neumann machines” was made
at Rand Corporation by a team of scientists headed by Alan Newell and Herbert
Simon. They developed the Logic Theory Machine which, the researchers claimed,
could solve all logical problems that had been plaguing philosophers from Plato to
Kant. Further, the researchers claimed that the machines could think, learn, and
create like humans; in fact the machines could, these researchers claimed, exhibit
human intelligence. In fact some researchers went so far as to predict that within
a few years these machines would win the world chess championship and solve all
logical problems. In reality, however, the General Problem Solver’s ability did not
meet this claim. First, the General Problem Solver could do relatively easy problems
in a small number of fields, all involving games and puzzles. Second, the General
Problem Solver had to be programmed anew for each sort of problem it attacked.
For whatever “skills” the General Problem Solver learned in one field, it could not
transfer to another field as humans do. Third, as I said in chapter 5, one important
factor in human learning is that although one may learn rules propositionally, these
rules become a matter of habit for that individual as in the case of swimming or
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riding a bike. In the case of the General Problem Solver, however, at no stage
internalization of rules occurred. Fourth, the General Problem Solver could not get
information from the external world as humans do. Fifth, much of natural language
is so vague that it could not be symbolized properly for the machine. Sixth, these
machines could not recognize patterns. Thus, failing to take note of how the human
brain actually works, the machines failed to do what their makers claimed — exhibit
human intelligence. Indeed, Dreyfus (1968) says,
Negative results, provided one recognizes them as such, can be interesting.
Diminishing achievement, instead of predicting
... success, perhaps indicates
some unexpected phenomenon. Perhaps we are pushing out on a continuum
1 e that of velocity, where further acceleration costs more and more energy
as we approach the speed of light, or perhaps we are instead facing a discon-
tinuity, which requires not greater effort but entirely different techniques, as
in the case of the tree climbing man who tries to reach the moon. (p. 12).
The failure of the first phase of AI researchers to fulfill their claim was gen-
erally blamed by the researchers on lack of funding and technological drawbacks.
After the initial setback, with technical advancement and more funding, research
on digital computers progressed; researchers claimed to have solved all problems
faced by their predecessor. Minsky tried to proceed along the theory that meaning
is a matter of symbolic manipulation. He tried to codify knowledge of the world
by putting it into “packets” of semantic interconnections. Research on symbolic
representation and manipulation of meaning resulted in some success in technology.
Of these noteworthy are machines like DENDRAL and SHRDLU. DENDRAL was
successful in some practical fields such as logic and analysis; it could infer the
chemical structure of a compound from its mass spectometry data. Nonetheless,
it could not exhibit intelligence in the way a child does when he or she understands
a nursery rhyme. SHRDLU, developed in MIT, was a simulation of mechanical arm
that could manipulate blocks of several shapes and colors in a computer simulated
world. Haugeland (1986) observes that SHRDLU is the best known and the most
impressive block world program (p. 186). Although SHRDLU’s knowledge and
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vocabulary was limited to blocks at a particular table, yet within this world he has
skills; he could understand complex noun phrases and ambiguous pronouns. He
could also understand when a sentence is vague or ambiguous; in addition, he could
follow simple instruction of moving the blocks around and do one job, say a, before
another, say dq, if asked to do so.
Further, new words could be defined for SHDRLU by representing them in the
forms of propositions. An interesting feature of SHRDLU was that it could learn
words (concepts) via propositions. The following is an example of SHRDLU’s skill:
• Move the red block (Instruction).
• OK.
• SHDRLU moves a green block to make space so that he can reach out and
grasp the red block and move it.
• Move the square.
• I DO NOT KNOW WHICH ONE.
• There are three squares and SHRDLU is asking which one should he move.
• Find the tallest block (Instruction).
• The system has to figure out what “tallest” means here.
• I ASSUME THAT TALLEST MEAN “TALLER THAN THE OTHER BLOCKS”
.
• Remove the ball (Instruction).
• SORRY, I DO NOT KNOW THE MEANING OF BALL.
• “Ball” means the round thing.
When a word is defined it is always put in inverted commas.
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• Put the ball on the square (Instruction).
• OK.
• Here one can use the word “ball” to instruct SHRDLU as it has already been
definedQ .
In spite of its success, in reality SHRDLU’s powers were very limited. First of
all, it could only answer questions about its own domain. Second, SHDRLU had no
purposive action unless purpose was introduced in the forms of instructions. Third,
he had no problem with swiftly shifting instruction — something greatly resented
by most humans - such as, “move the block”, “take the square”, etc. Haugeland
observes,
SHDRLU performs so glibly only because his domain has been striped of
anything that could ... require genuine wit or understanding Neglecting
the tangled intricacies of everyday life while pursuing a theory of common
sense is not like ignoring friction while pursuing the laws of motion; it’s like
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. A round, frictionless wheel is a
good approximation of a real wheel because the deviations are comparitively
small and theoretically localized; the block world “approximates” a playroom
more as a paper plane approximates a duck. (p. 190).
In the 1950 s lobotics research gained some popularity amongst researchers in
Artificial Intelligence. Essentially such researchers tried to give the computer a
body (robotics) so that the robot like human beings can get information directly
from the environment. Research in this area were not successful for, unlike in the
case of the human, the robot’s body had to be represented to it. So it had to know
its own body before knowing anything else. Moreover, one of the problems here was
that the more data was fed to the robot, the longer time the machine took to recognize
patterns. In humans the case was exactly reverse; the more skillful one is in one’s
job (swimming, riding), the less time he would take to do it. Furthermore, these
2
I have adapted this small “conversation” from Haugeland (1986) p. 188.
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researchers had no idea of how to organize data well to create programs by which
robots could recognize relevant information about the context in which they were
situated. Thus, both digital computers and robotics researches failed to reproduce
human reasoning artificially.
Roger Roseblatt (1950) tried a different way to reproduce human reasoning
artificially. He developed a neural net or Perceptron which was a copy of the human
brain in terms of electronic circuity. The first perceptrons that were produced in
the United States were all very simple because (1) knowledge about electronics was
very limited and (2) contemporary knowledge of the physiology of the brain was
very limited. Rosenblatt’s Perceptron had an input unit, which received stimulus
from the external world, a two dimensional array, and an associative unit to regulate
the electrical current between the input and the responses. The Perceptrons could
recognize some simple patterns. Unlike digital computers Perceptrons did not have
to be fed directly with data; they could gather information from the environment and
through electrical pathways (corresponding to the nervous system in humans) and
could eventually learn to perceive patterns by trial and error. Further, while digital
computers processed the data sequentially, Perceptrons were parallel processors as
they had to process several signals coming from the same object at once.
Perceptrons were not very successful in reproducing human reasoning. They
were very slow and their work could not be transfered to any other field. Moreover,
although neural nets claimed to be very different from digital computers, they were
still based on Von Neumann’s theory. In addition, the electric currents did not
accurately reflect the synaptic responses of human brain. Also, while in human
brain all neurons do not work in the same way as the electric discharge is different
for different neuron, in neural net they are uniform and predictable. Furthermore,
while peripheral nodes are not programmed in neural nets, inner ones were. Ricardo
Flores says,
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The technological problem, at present, is that even neural nets continue to be
run by Von Neumann machines. Neural nets are merely representations in
conventional digital hardware of what would be actually neural connections
Also, wire-like connections between nodes in a neural net mimic only in a
remarkably crude way the synaptic connections that give complexity to the
bram. While the neural connections are more or less set and communications
between nodes is provided by discreet electrical charges, the physiological
neurons have unique patterns and use uneven amounts of electrical charges,
increasing in this way the amount of randomness and unpredictability of the
system. Finally, while peripheral nodes of the neural nets are flexible and
not programmed, hidden nodes continue to need algorithmic programming in
order to process information carried by digital on/off electrical currents
unlike cerebral interconnections, which do not have, as far as we know, any
semantic content or programming.
Research in neural network stalled until it was revived lately by Hopfield of
Caltech who is trying to produce a computer simulation of the brain; this machine,
as Hopfield claimed in Omni
,
will be a “bio-computer” which will be able to smell its
way thiough like a snail. This bio-computer” will have electrical circuits similar to
the dendiites in human. Data will not be “fed” to the computer, it will be obtained
by this computer; it will obtain data according to its embodied needs.
In Scientific American (March 1993) R.R. Birge talks of Protein Based Com-
puters which exploit some special properties of biological molecules — particularly
proteins — to build computer components consisting of cards with both proteins
and semiconductors (Figure 8.1, Page 127). Molecules, in such “hybrid” computer,
can serve as computer switches because their atoms can change position in a mobile
way; by directing that atomic position we can consistently generate states 0 and 1.
This switching is possible as some proteins can change their properties in response to
light. The two proteins that Birge talked about are rhodopsin and bacteriorhodopsin
(See Figure 8.2, Page 128) which are present in the retina of a mammal and include
a light absorbing component known as chromophore. With the help of laser beams
the scientist can get information into the cubes of bacteriorhodopsin and read it
Green laser beams are fired through a plane of the cube and the protein photocycle
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begins. Then, red laser beams are fired at the particular set of molecules in the plane
to be converted to binary state 1; the remaining molecules remain in binary state 0
(Figure 8.3, Page 129). Birge claims that the merits of such protein based computers
are as follows: (1) they facilitate parallel processing which is what computer scientists
want to do; (2) they provide more memory space than two-dimensional optical
memories; they can approach storage density of one trillion bits per c.c.; (3) they
are more speedy than ordinary computers. Birge says,
The hibrid computer we envision would be highly flexible the
computer should be able to handle large pools of data, carry out complex
scientific simulations or serve as a unique platform for investigations of arti-
cial intelligence. With close to terabyte (10 12 bytes) of memory in cubes of
bacteriorohodopsin, this machine would handle large databases with alacrity.
Associative memory processing coupled with volumetric memory would make
database searches many orders of magnitude faster than is currently possible.
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Because the hybrid computer can be designed to function as a neural associ-
ative computer capable of learning and of analyzing data and images in muchthe same way as the human brain, the likely importance of hybrid computersto study artificial intelligence cannot be underestimated
?Ar!w TSt aPPlication may well be found in yet another realmWith terabytes of data storage, neural associative capabilities and a high
capacity for parallel processing, hybrid computers will, for the first timeincorporate the three crucial requirement for artificial intelligence. We areindeed at the threshold of an exciting new era in computing (p. 95).
I have sketched above a brief history of research pertaining to “intelligent Von
Neumann machine”. Most of these researches were based on the assumption that
cognition (or meaning) is either a matter of heuristics or a matter of manipulation of
symbols. The fundamental cause of this failure, I contend, is the absence of a scientific
framework of the mental activity, a theory of reasoning, a theory of concepts, and a
theory of concept acquisition. Further, none of the researchers took any note of the
neurobiology of the brain. Even neural nets, which are modeled on the human brain,
used piogiams to manipulate data instead of getting information by experiencing the
external world as humans do. Hopfield’s and Birge’s proposed projects, which are
at this moment pure speculations, may be closer to artificially reproducing human
reasoning.
Concepts, as I have shown in this dissertation, are not logical items; they are
items in terms of which we think of the world. It is apparent from my discussion of
the operational theory of concepts that the theory assumes that knowing the meaning
of a concept is an ability. This ability consists of being able to use the concept in
accordance with the general usage of the linguistic community. This view is directly
opposed to the view that having a concept involves having the knowledge of some
inferential patterns. A notion related to the operational theory of concepts — one
that I have not discussed in the dissertation — is the notion of context. A child, I
contend, learns the concept of, say, an apple by playing with it, biting into it, etc; he
learns the concept of an apple within a practical context. The same holds true for all
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other concepts; one has to have a mastery of his or her practical context before one
acquires the ability to use concepts. This “practical context” involves the biological
and even the greater social context in which the child is immersed - a fact ignored
by most researchers in Artificial Intelligence. We have to first experience the whole
and then understand concepts in the context of this whole3
. The notion of context
raises philosophically interesting questions; it raises the important question whether
intelligence or meaning is essentially a human entity. That, however, is a topic for a
different dissertation and I leave that for further research.
3 Going from the whole to the part is not the same as “top-down information processing” which
primarily has a cognitive overtone.
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